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Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of
Financial Indices
Gabriel Rauterberg and Andrew Versteint
Financial indices, like the S&P 500 or the Consumer Price Index, have
become a ubiquitousfeature of ourfinancial markets. One index, the London
InterBank Offered Rate ("Libor"), may be the world's most importantnumber,
an interest rate benchmark upon which hundreds of trillions of dollars depend.
Yet, almost every day new revelations emerge that Libor was tampered with
during the height of the financial crisis by one or many of the world's most
prominent banks, with billions of dollars potentially misappropriated.This
index disruption has attracted tremendous interest from regulators, private
litigants, and market observers. Despite their importance, however, financial
indices arepoorly understood,and almost completely unstudied. In this Article,
we explain why and how people use financial indices as well as how they are
created. We show human discretion and value judgment to be essential
ingredients in even the most "objective" indices. We then develop a taxonomy
of financial indices, illustrating how the risks indices can pose, and the
solutions applicable to those risks, are intimately related to the motivation that
drives the index's creation. We show that the manipulation of indices is
unsurprising given the precarious state of intellectual property rights in
indices. While many call for prosecuting or regulating the Libor banks, our
novel solution is to strengthen property rights for those who createfinancial
indices.
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Introduction
Libor has been called "the world's most important number." It is "the
dominant global benchmark for interest rates" 2 and represents the cost of
1. LIBOR: The World's Most Important Number, MONEYWEEK, Oct. 10,2008, http:/www.
moneyweek.com/personal-financelibor-the-worlds-most-iniportant-number- 13816; see also Donald
MacKenzie, What's in a Number?, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2008, at 11I(describing Libor's
importance); cf. Carrick Mollenkamp, Libor Fog: Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, at Al, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12l200703762027135.html (reporting that
trillion in contracts
i500 are indexed to Libor).
2.
MacKenzie, supra note 1, at 11; cf Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts
Doubt on Key Rate, WALL S. J., May 29, 2008, at Al, http://online.wsj.comarticle
SBLIb2120070376202735.ht
(explaining that Libor "plays a vital role in the global economy").
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money for hundreds of millions of people and hundreds of trillions of dollars,
from high finance to homeowners. Over $360 trillion is indexed to Libor 3-the
London InterBank Offered Rate 4 -or about $50,000 per human being. Libor is
"the language of the large capital markets," 5 dominating the interest-rate swap
markets,6 syndicated loans, 7 and powerfully influencing residential and
commercial mortgages. 8 And in the worst hours of the financial crisis, some of
Libor's makers set out to manipulate it.
In recent months, dozens of bank employees have lost their jobs for
attempting to manipulate Libor,9 including top executives at major investment
banks.' 0 Most prominently, Barclays Plc recently disclosed a litany of abuses
by its traders and paid $450 million to settle some of US and UK regulators'
allegations." Japanese regulators have imposed penalties for attempted
manipulation of the Tibor, Tokyo's Libor equivalent,12 and several banks have
admitted their traders' involvement in a rate-fixing scheme to authorities.' 3 All
at once, economists, 14 journalists,15 plaintiffs' lawyers,' 6 and regulators' 7 have
turned to ask whether Libor was successfully manipulated and how.

3.
Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Stress and Deleveraging - Macrofinancial
Implications and Policy, INT'L MONETARY FUND, at xv (Oct. 2008), http://www.imf.org/externall
pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf; Dennis Kuo, David Skeie & James Vickery, A Comparison of Libor
to Other Measures of Bank Borrowing Costs 1 (June 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/vickeryLiborKSV-staff webpage.pdf.
4.
The Basics, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/the-basics (last
visited Feb. 27, 2012).
5.
Mike Carsella, Libor: Immensely Important-Little Understood, SECURED LENDER,
July/August 2009, at 47, 48, http://www.thesecuredlender-digital.com/thesecuredlender/20090708/
?pg-49.
Kuo et al., supra note 3.
6.
7.
Xanthe Lok, Libor and Market Disruption: The Future of Libor, 23 BUTTERWORTHS J.
INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 421, 421 (2008).
Justin T. Wong, Libor Left in Limbo; A Callfor More Reform, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. J.
8.
365, 365 (2009) (reporting that Libor is the reference rate for $900 billion in subprime mortgages);
Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Libor's Rise May Sock Many Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008, at Bl,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl20856108868827857.html; Kuo et al., supra note 3.
9.
Richard Pullin, Traders Fired,Suspended Over LIBOR Probe: FT, REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-investigation-interbank-lending9:32
PM),
idUSTRE81807L20120209; UBS Fires Traders and Managers Over Libor- Report, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
5, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120805-700657.html.
Sara Schaefer Muiloz & Max Colchester, Top Officials at Barclays Resign Over Rate
10.
Scandal, WALL ST. J. (July 4, 2012, 8:22 AM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB 10001424052702304299704577503974000425002.html.
11.
Steve Slater, Barclays Sets Out Defense on Libor Fixing, REUTERS (July 3, 2012, 6:21
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/us-barclays-defence-idUSBRE8621CO20120703.
Atsuko Fukase, Update: Japan'sFinancialRegulatorsSanction Citi Japanfor 3rd Time in
12.
Seven Years, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2011, 6:34 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111216704569.html.
13.
Jean Eaglesham, Paul Vieira & David Enrich, Traders ManipulatedKey Rate, Bank Says,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2012, at Cl, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702
04059804577227452963906044.html.
See, e.g., Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks' Borrowing
14.
Costs? (Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract= 1569603.
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These revelations are surprising to many who assume that Libor is based
on observable market data and is incapable of manipulation. Few realize that
Libor is published by a consortium of Libor's biggest users, the British
Bankers' Association. It uses banks' proprietary data and is highly
discretionary due to its reliance on subjective judgment. In the end, Libor is
calculated and set every day by the judgment of one man, John Ewan, a
financial-services professional in his mid-thirties.' 8 Despite its importance, its
susceptibility to influence, and allegations of its manipulation, Libor remains
essentially unregulated.
The effects of index manipulation could be vast. Back-of-the-envelope
estimates suggest that fraudulent interest rates could have generated billions of
dollars in illicit profits for the scheme's perpetrators' 9 and transferred more
than a trillion dollars from the scheme's victims. 2 0 One study found that if the
6-month Libor hovered 1.75% higher than historical averages, as it did in early
2008, then the average subprime borrower would pay an additional $100 per
month per $100,000 of home equity. 2 1 Thus a modest manipulation upward in
Libor could easily extract $1000 to $2000 per year from a typical subprime
borrower. Regressive by any standard, this would increase mortgage defaults at
a time when they already pose systemic risk concerns. The story is little better
if Libor ends up too low: "A lower Libor induces a lower mortgage rate, makes
it easier to buy homes, substituting homes away for other goods. This
artificially inflates the prices of homes . . . hav[ing] the potential to lead to

bubbles and meltdowns of the type we are currently experiencing."22 Most
importantly, regardless of who wins or loses in a particular manipulation, faulty
Libor quotes undermine the integrity and efficiency of the world's borrowing
markets.
On the one hand, Libor is unique. Its importance is arguably greater than
any other product, firm, or even industry, and its manipulation is front-page
news. On the other hand, Libor is just one of many financial indices, all of
15.
See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Bank Lending Probe Lights Up Dark Financial Corners, FIN.
TIMES,
Feb.
9,
2012,
at
20, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3d447b98-533e-l lel-aafd00144feabdcO.html.
16.
See In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-02262, 2011 WL
5980198 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011) (In re Libor).
17.
Carrick Mollenkamp, Exclusive: U.S. Conducting Criminal Libor Probe, REUTERS (Feb.
29,
2012,
11:24
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/29/us-libor-probeidUSTRE81 RIZG20120229.
18.
Interview with John Ewan, Managing Director, BBA Libor (June 15, 2011).
19.
Tom Osborn, Is Libor in Its Death Throes?, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-10-3 1/libor-death-throes.
20.
Libor Penalty, FIN.
TIMES
LEXICON
(Feb.
10,
2012,
8:02
PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/3/Olaeca7a-53f2-1 lel-bacb-00144feabdcO.html.
21.
Mark Schweitzer & Guhan Venkatu, Adjustable-Rate Mortgages and the Libor Surprise,
FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/
2009/012109.cfm.
22.
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Sofia B. Villas-Boas & George Judge, Tracking the Libor Rate,
18 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 893, 897-99 (2011).
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which are little understood, but many of which have great importance. The
S&P 500 is the leading indicator of the state of the U.S. economy and the stock
market's daily returns, with well over $1 trillion of investments tied to it alone.
Almost one-third of all federal outlays rise with CPI, the Consumer Price
Index, as do federal marginal tax rates. 23 Everywhere we rely on indices to
aggregate information, guide our investments, and settle our contracts.
In light of their importance, the scholarly neglect of financial indices is
remarkable. As one observer has remarked: "Only a handful of economists, and
no other academics, have ever looked in any detail at Libor." 24 Critical thinking
about other indices fares no better. Academics and regulators have largely
ignored the indispensable role indices play in markets, failing to articulate why
financial indices have grown so quickly in importance, how they function, and
the risks they face.
This Article attempts to answer the tough questions about Libor: given the
impartial character we associate with indices, how is it even possible to
manipulate Libor? Given the risks of manipulation, why did users trust it (and
why do they continue to trust it)? Why would a bank risk its credibility through
manipulation? What can we do to prevent potential manipulation in the future?
But these are equally questions about all indices. Indices are the
indispensable and invisible infrastructure of modem finance, and this Article
aims to provide the theoretical tools necessary to illuminate them.
Part I explains how indices work. Section A shows how parties use
indices as blueprints for investments, as referents for contracts, and as sources
of information. Section B argues that these benefits are rooted in methodologies
driven far more by human discretion than many might have expected. In
explaining the inner life of indexing, we refute a myth of objectivity that
prevents any realistic understanding of indices. Regulators and scholars alike
ignore the ineradicable subjectivity that is part of the index production process.
As a result, they fixate on solutions that eliminate, rather than manage, human
involvement in index creation.
We then move in Part II to our primary ambition: a theory of financial
indices. In Section A, we develop a taxonomy to categorize and illuminate the
world of financial indices. Section B discusses the different motivations for

Michael J. Boskin et al., Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living: Final
23.
Report to the Senate Finance Committee From the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price
Index (Dec. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Boskin Report], reprinted in GETTING PRICES RIGHT: THE DEBATE
OVER THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 5, 13 (Dean Baker ed., 1998); see also Alex M. Parker, Debt Ceiling
Deal Could Mean Social Security Cuts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28, 2011, at 1,
http://www.usnews.com/newsfarticles/2011/06/28/debt-ceiling-deal-could-mean-social-security-cuts
("Changing the CPI would affect Social Security benefits and retirement payments for federal
employees, as well as income taxes, but could be billed by lawmakers as a technical adjustment, not a
tax hike or benefit cut."). See generally Bart Hobijn & David Lagakos, Social Security and the
Consumer Price Index for the Elderly, CURRENT ISSUES EcON. & FIN. (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.),
May 2003, at 1 (discussing relationship between CPI and social security payments).
24.
MacKenzie, supra note 1, at I1.
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index production and argues that these motivations are the defining feature of
each type of index. In Section C, we discuss the different risks indices face and
the ways in which indices can fail. Finally, in Section D, we survey potential
solutions to index problems. We show throughout that the model and taxonomy
we have developed for analyzing indices predicts the risks that specific indices
will face and the solutions that are best suited to those risks. There is no "best"
type of index, no single solution that works well across index types, and no
solution without tradeoffs.
Though there are no easy answers, we show that the most commonly
discussed solutions to the Libor disruption-market-based contracting,
litigation-based enforcement, and government control over the process-are
insufficient. We make an alternative proposal. We offer the first scholarly
examination of the law-intellectual property law-governing indices as a
business, and argue that it is intellectual property law that offers the most
promising approach to preventing many forms of index dysfunction. For
decades, financial index providers had secure property rights, which provided
incentives for them to produce adequate quality and quantity. Recent judicial
decisions have severely limited index providers' rights, pressuring many
indices to accept more conflicted and compromised business models. We
propose restoring and rationalizing index property rights.
I. How Indices Work
A. Uses of Indices
There are three basic uses for indices: they are used as (1) blueprints to
guide investment, (2) contract referents, and (3) information sources. These
uses explain why there are now over $1.6 trillion in assets invested in vehicles
that track indices, and hundreds of trillions of dollars contractually based on
an index referent. 2 6
1. Blueprinting
One of the most important uses of indices is as investment blueprints. In
the financial architecture of the early twentieth century, investment managers
served as both architects and general contractors for actively managed funds.
They would conceive of the investment strategy and then execute trades to
implement it. But it will sometimes be cheaper for many general contractors to

25.
Knowledge@Wharton, IfIndex Funds Perform Better, Why Are Actively Managed Funds
More Popular?, WHARTON SCH., UNIV. OF PENN. (Feb. 2, 2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article.cfm?articleid=2702.
26.
Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1.
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hire a single architect than for each to hire its own. 2 7 It is even possible for
many contractors to work from the same blueprint, capitalizing the cost of
drafting the plan across many identical homes. Indices are blueprints for
investment strategies.
An index fund follows clear instructions regarding which assets to buy in
order to track the returns of a financial index. The S&P 500's input list and
methodology is used as an investment plan (buy these 500 stocks in such-andsuch proportions, and then rebalance the portfolio as the index changes) that
many funds follow. In this way, Standard & Poor's serves by proxy as fund
manager for the many funds that track the S&P 500.
The use of financial indices as blueprints provides three important benefits
for investors. First, it allows investors to profit from economies of scale.
Individual needs are often similar enough that a single blueprint will satisfy
many different people, who can share the cost of its production. Rather than
hiring a fund manager, a fund can subscribe to a financial index and replicate
its composition and returns. Indexed investing is often cheaper than individual
management,28 which can significantly increase an investor's overall return. 2 9
Second, the use of indices as blueprints can lower governance and
monitoring costs. An investor in an actively managed fund may find it difficult
to determine the quality of her investment manager. Returns may be determined
by forces other than the manager's behavior, and expensive bonding and
monitoring may be required to guarantee trust. 30 However, it is easy for
investors to verify the quality of an index fund manager. Such funds publish
their expense ratios and how closely their strategy tracked the index return.
These two variables are easy to understand and compare. The return from most
S&P 500 exchange traded funds (ETFs) should be identical, subject to fees and
tracking error, allowing competition to discipline managers. 3 1
Finally, index-guided investment lets retail investors take advantage of
two of the most important financial insights of the late twentieth century: the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis, which posits that market prices reflect all

27.
For a discussion of the shared management of an entire fund family, see John Morley, The
Separation of Investments and Management (Mar. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdfcbl/MorleyTheSeparation-ofInvestmentsandManagement
.pdf.
28.
Vanguard
Expense
Ratios,
VANGUARD
GROUP
(2009),
https://advisors.vanguard.com/iwe/pdf/FASHERC.pdf (noting that Vanguard expenses to investors are a
mere 0.2% of assets).
29.
Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm (last modified Aug. 8, 2007). $10,000 invested at 10% return
for 20 years yields about $60,000 if annual fees are 0.5%, which is typical of an index fund. A managed
fund charging 1.5% would leave the investor with less than $50,000.
30.
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976) (describing
agency costs in terms of monitoring, bonding and residual loss).
31.
Even funds that do not track the index use it as a basis for comparison. Many funds
compare themselves to the S&P 500 as a useful touchstone for describing risk and return.
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available financial information, 32 and Modem Portfolio Theory, which posits
that diversified portfolios can achieve similar returns at less risk than
undiversified portfolios--or superior returns with equal risk.
At the intersection of these two theories is the index fund, which is an
investment strategy based on investing in a diversified portfolio of passively
managed assets. Asset managers rely on an index to provide the recipe for
diversification, saving costs along the way.34
Indeed, a broad consensus has emerged that passive, indexed investing
outperforms actively managed funds. 35 When costs are included, index funds
surpass actively managed investment strategies, year after year. 3 6 As Burton
Malkiel has put it, there is "[a] remarkably large body of evidence suggesting
that professional investment managers are not able to outperform index funds
that simply buy and hold the broad stock market portfolio" and that
"[t]hroughout the past decade about three-quarters of actively managed funds
have failed to beat the index."37
2. Contracting
While funds are concerned with index inputs as blueprints, contracts are
concerned with index outputs as reference terms. The use of indices as contract
terms allows parties to (i) achieve more efficient coordination, especially in
long-term contracts, and (ii) construct more sophisticated and precise investing
instruments and derivatives.

32.
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 384 (1970); Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57
(1997). The implication is that active managers are unlikely to discover underpriced securities; it is
therefore unwise to pay a manager to try to outperform the market.
33.
HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF
INVESTMENTS 5 (2d ed. 1991). Smart investors thus diversify their holdings to eliminate idiosyncratic
risk, eschewing individual stocks in favor of diversified portfolios. See Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient
Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 78 (2003) [hereinafter Malkiel, The Efficient
Market Hypothesis] ("[Tihe median large capitalization professionally managed equity fund has
underperformed the S&P 500 index by almost two percentage points over the past 10, 15, and 20-year
periods."); Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J. FIN.
549 (1995).
34.
Arguably, diversification is conceptually distinct from blueprinting because one might
want diversification either as the product of the blueprint, or in the course of settling contracts, or in
order to evaluate markets.
35.
See Standard & Poor's Indices Versus Active (SPIVA), S&P DOW JONES INDICES,
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/spiva/en/us (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
36.
BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (2003); Malkiel, The Efficient
Market Hypothesis, supra note 33, at 77; William F. Sharpe, The Arithmetic ofActive Management, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 7.
37.
Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis, supranote 33, at 77-78.
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i. Long-Term Contracts
Long term contracts involve significant risks of opportunism. After the
parties agree to terms, the market price may change, tempting one party to
escape the contract in order to buy or sell on the open market. Amid this
uncertainty, many long-term contracts require specific investments in
equipment and processes. Fear of opportunism and breach discourage
transaction-specific investments that increase the gains from trade.
For parties who wish to make a long-term agreement, there are many
contractual solutions to these problems. For example, the parties could set fixed
prices now, complete with a schedule of future changes (say, a 5% increase per
year). Another solution is a cost-plus contract, in which the seller bills the
buyer for the production cost plus some fixed margin, which protects the seller
against price swings and eliminates their temptation to breach opportunistically.
Alternatively, the parties could select some single price number to act as a
referent in their contracts, such as the prime rate of a well-known bank.
Hopefully, that rate would move in keeping with their target price.
Financial indices often outperform each of these options. Negotiating a
price schedule encourages both parties to engage in potentially wasteful price
research so that they can propose a price schedule that is likely to benefit
them.40 Despite such research, the parties are likely to guess incorrectly about
future prices and find themselves with an inefficient contract.41
Cost-plus contracts suffer from high monitoring and moral hazard costs. A
contract written in reference to the seller's costs may be subject to
manipulation, provide poor incentives to control costs, and require expensive
monitoring efforts.42 Cost-plus contracts also require the seller to make their
costs known, spawning confidentiality concerns that the seller may prefer not to
risk.43

38.
Nick van der Beek, Long-Term Contracts and Relational Contracts, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 281, 283 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).
E.g., FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 532 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he contract specifies a
39.
prematurity rate equal to FNB-Midland Prime plus one percent. . . .").
40.

VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW 328 (2007). See also Alexander J. Triantis

& George G. Triantis, Timing Problems in ContractBreach Decisions, 41 J.L. & ECON. 163, 196 (1998).
41.
Paul L. Joskow, Price Adjustments in Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal, 31 J.L. &
ECON. 47, 52 (1988). "If the probability of wasteful behavior increases as the divergence between
contract price and the opportunity cost of the aggrieved party widens, price adjustment rules which
narrow the gap become increasingly attractive." GOLDBERG, supra note 40, at 329. See also Keith J.
Crocker & Thomas P. Lyon, What Do "FacilitatingPractices"Facilitate?An EmpiricalInvestigationof
Most-Favored-NationClauses in Natural Gas Contracts, 37 J.L. & ECON. 297, 303 (1994). "The payoff
from indexing," Victor Goldberg states, "is from the reduction in the divergence between the contract
price and the market price." GOLDBERG, supra note 40, at 329. To be sure, if the market price drops
below the seller's costs, a market price index may tempt her to breach. But that is an efficient breach and
should not cause concern.
42.
Id. at 329-30.
Id. at 351 (discussing Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D.
43.
Penn. 1980) (ALCOA)).
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As for individual referents, they may vary in value idiosyncratically. By
contrast, indices' diversified character reduces volatility.44 Volatility matters
because the power to breach a contract can be considered an implicit, or
embedded, option in that contract. 45 As volatility is reduced, the exercise of the
option becomes less profitable4 and breach becomes less likely.47
Effective contracting is about getting the best incentive bang for the
contracting buck.48 In addition to effectively maximizing parties' incentives to
perform, indices also allow parties to minimize the cost of negotiation by
avoiding contractual questions that cost more to answer than they provide in
benefits.
Some contracts are notoriously costly to negotiate. Mutual distrust,
collective bargaining constraints, and wage stickiness can make labor and
employment negotiations costly. 49 Perhaps for this reason, unions were the
earliest advocates of the use of consumer price indices as a reference point for
wage terms in contracts.50 A mutually amenable index may rein in acrimonious
discussions without requiring parties to resolve every outcome.51
Scholars have long understood that contracts are often left incomplete in
rational reliance on subsequent judicial interpretation.52 Financial indices

44.
Id. at 328.
45.
Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing,24 J. LEG. STUD. 139 (1995)
(using option theory to explain the common law's preference for money damages rather than specific
performance); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against
Compensation in ContractLaw, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1429 (2004) ("Rather than conceiving of
damages as compensation, the right to breach and pay damages is better understood as a valuable option
sold by the promisee to the promisor."); Triantis & Triantis, supra note 40, at 201 (arguing that
expectation damages encourage inefficient breach because they fail to compensate contractors for value
of plaintiff's own lost breach).
46.
IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 7, 44-66 (2005);
JOHN C. HULL, FUNDAMENTALS OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS 279-80 (5th ed. 2005); George S.
Geis, An Embedded Options Theory ofIndefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1700 (2006).
47.
Note, however, that basis risk can be increased if an inappropriate index is chosen or if the
index provider changes its methodology. See Andrew Verstein, Interim Contracting (or Ex Tempore
Contracting) (Aug. 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-2125169.
48.
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 817 (2006).
49.
See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, PRICES AND QUANTITIES: A MACROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1981) (elaborating theory of wage stickiness).
50.
See generally THOMAS A. STAPLEFORD, THE COST OF LIVING IN AMERICA 256 (2009)
(describing the rise of the CPI in collective bargaining agreements). Irving Fisher insisted that his
employees accept weekly wage modifications, subject to a wholesale price index established by the
Index Number Institute. Robert W. Dimand, Irving Fisher and Index Bonds, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 224,
225 (1999). His employees' resistance to this program, particularly when it caused nominal wages to
decline, led Fisher to develop his theory of the "money illusion." IRVING FISHER, THE MONEY ILLUSION
(1997). One wonders, however, whether resistance was due to cognitive limitations, or perceptions of
conflicts of interest: the Index Number Institute operated out of Fisher's house. See Dimand, supra, at
225.
Richard Posner describes deliberate ambiguity, another tool for avoiding a protracted
51.
negotiation, as "a form of compromise like 'agreeing to disagree."' Richard A. Posner, The Law and
Economics of ContractInterpretation,83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2005).
52.
Scott & Triantis, supra note 48, at 845.
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provide an entirely new way to draft a less-than-fully-specified contract: the
contracting parties agree to let the index provider decide the price.53 That way
the parties need not specify ex ante every day's price, but also they need not
wait for expost adjudication to know the price. When it is costly for contractors
to decide, and it is costly for courts to decide, a financial index can decide,
providing a type of "live" certainty as to obligations.
In addition to lowering total contracting and adjudication costs, this
arrangement allows the parties to benefit from the index provider's expertise in
pricing. 54 For example, the parties in Eastern Air Lines v. Gulf Oil had set their
oil supply contract to follow the Platts oil price index. " Their contract did not
specify what should happen if oil price controls were relaxed for some, but not
all, of the relevant oil. It was probably rational for their contract not to resolve
that peculiar issue ex ante. Yet, the parties might not have trusted a court to
understand the commercial factors involved with resolving this issue. By
contrast, Platts was well positioned to interpret how this market change affected
the contract price. The index provider had detailed market data. It likely knew
how other customers were affected by the recent market changes and it could
use that information to make a methodological choice that jointly maximized
all customers' contracts. The parties in Gulf Oil did not fully specify their price
schedule for every contingency, but neither did they leave it to a judge; they
left it to Platts.
ii. Derivative Contracts
Indices also enable cheaper forms of traditional investing and new forms
of investable assets by facilitating financial derivative contracts. Many
derivative contracts use a financial index number as the settlement value that
determines who owes whom. For example, an S&P 500 future contract pays an
investor the value of the S&P 500 on any given day.
Retail investors can use these contracts to achieve broad market exposure
and diversification. 5 6 Sophisticated investors can use index-based derivatives to
implement increasingly nuanced investment strategies. Suppose an investor
feels certain that Exxon will outperform the market but is unsure of how the
market will do. With index options, she can make an investment that reflects
this view by buying Exxon stock and shorting S&P 500 futures. The net cost of
the transaction could be zero and yet yield the exposure she desires.

53.
See Verstein, supra note 47.
Id.
54.
55.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 433 (S.D. Fla. 1975) ("The
indicator selected by the parties was 'the average of the posted prices for West Texas sour crude, 30.030.9 gravity of Gulf Oil Corporation, Shell Oil Company, and Pan American Petroleum Corporation.'
The posting of crude prices under the contract 'shall be as listed for these companies in Platts Oilgram
Service-Crude Oil Supplement. . ."').
56.

IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING (2010).
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Financial indices also enable derivatives through which parties can hedge
against the market's most daunting risks. Interest-rate derivatives were born out
of increasing interest volatility, which created a risk that a bank's costs of funds
would rise after having made a loan. Banks would have preferred to make
variable-rate loans linking their revenue stream to the same forces shaping their
liabilities, but borrowers strongly preferred the certainty of a fixed-rate loan. It
might have seemed that either the bank or its borrower must bear the risk of
interest rate fluctuation.
Index-linked derivatives allowed a third option: the bank could lend at a
floating rate and the borrower could swap the floating rate obligation to some
third party in exchange for a fixed obligation. Through this sort of triangular
borrowing, the risk can be shifted to a party with an appetite for it. These kinds
of transactions are now ubiquitous. An ISDA survey of derivative end-users
found that 80% of responding companies used interest rate swaps to manage
interest rate risks.57 The City of Baltimore, for example, has "hundreds of
millions of dollars" in interest rate derivatives linked to Libor.58 Interest-rate
swaps are the largest financial derivative by far, and Libor is the referent used
in most of those contracts. 5 9
Indices have also enabled investors to invest in specific kinds of assets
that previously did not exist. For example the creation of the S&P 500 index
allowed the creation of the VIX, a volatility index. The VIX, published by the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), is a measure of the implied
volatility of the S&P 500.6 The VIX increases when stock prices are unstable
and decreases when returns are most predictable. VIX contracts allow investors
to take a position on volatility itself It has been enormously popular as a result;
VIX contracts are among the most traded on the CBOE. ' Changing one's
volatility exposure is now as simple a matter as buying stock in Apple-it can
be accomplished in seconds with an online trading account. The future of
indices portends only greater asset creation and accessibility. 6 2

57.

ISDA End-User Survey: Interest Rate Swaps, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES Ass'N, INC. 2

(Oct. 2010), http://www.isda.org/media/pdf/End-User-Survey-IRS-only.pdf.
58.
See In re Libor, No. 1:11 -md-02262, 2011 WL 5980198, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011).
59.
Libor is also a settlement value in CME Eurodollar Futures Contracts, among the most
liquid exchange traded derivatives.
60.
Introduction to VIX Options and Futures, CHICAGO BD. OPTIONS Ex.,
http://www.cboe.com/microNIX/vixintro.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
61.
Brendan Conway, Investing in Fear Is Big Business, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 29, 2010, at Cl,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703785704575642643319238142.html.
62.
See, e.g., Bhakti Mirchandani & Alexandra Connell, 27 J.L. & COM. 209 (2009) (calling
for a microfinance investment index in order to improve hedging and provide cheaper access to the
industry).
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3. Price Information
Finally, financial indices convey information, increasing price
transparency and improving markets. Indices are powerful primarily because
they solve collective action problems implicit in price discovery. First, price
research is sometimes susceptible to the tragedy of the commons. 63 Traders in a
commodity are ex ante rational to investigate its price in other markets, as well
as the likely future price. These research costs can become duplicative and
wasteful as parties jockey for an informational edge at their counterparty's
expense. Indices can discourage excessive price research by allowing parties
to share the research and its costs. By selling the fruit of its price research,
index providers like Platts can act as designated investigators, bringing
information to the market at a lower cost for all.
Indices also ingeniously solve the collective action problem of too little
information production. Every trader has private information about commodity
prices. They may know something about local supply levels, about the most
recent price at which they transacted, or even their own willingness to buy or
sell. Because this information ultimately bears on the commodity price, it is
valuable.65 Though each market participant enjoys free-riding on the
information disclosure of other participants, none has an incentive to disclose
her own.
Indices obtain private information by offering the prospect of liquidity and
diversification to induce traders to share it, acting as a platform for information
trading.66 For example, the ABX index, which tracks the value of mortgagebacked securities, has served as the settlement price for certain financial
derivatives since 2006. 67 Such derivatives allowed investors to place synthetic
bets on the US subprime market and provided a payoff for expressing
contrarian views (when right). These bets would affect the public price of the
derivatives, allowing others to see which way the wind is blowing.68

63.
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
64. This is akin to the racing problem often described in reference to homesteading and
fishing. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis and the Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 1690 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002).
65.
Cf J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffry M. Netter & James A. Overdahl, Prices Are Property: The
Organization of Financial Exchangesfrom a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J. L. & ECON. 2 (1991)
(analyzing history of information control and freeriding around exchanges); Pete Locke, Natural Gas
Price Transparency and Liquidity 2-3 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ngsa.org/
assets/Docs/Natural %20Gas Market TransparencyOctober%202006_Finall.pdf
(discussing "free
rider" problem in trading).
66.
Exchanges perform this function as well, but many assets, such as mortgage-backed
securities, do not trade on exchanges.
67.
Press Release, Markit Group, CDS Indexco and Markit Launch Synthetic ABS Index (Jan.
17, 2006), http://www.markit.com/en/media-centre/press-releases/detail.page?dcr=/markit/PressRelease/
data/2006/01/2006-01-17.
68.
Cf DOUGLAS J. LUCAS ET AL., DEVELOPMENTS IN COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS:
NEW PRODUCTS AND INSIGHTS 97 (2007) (describing importance of ABX index to information).
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Prior to the advent of the ABX, positions in subprime were expressed by
negotiating bespoke derivatives with an investment bank. Gary Gorton
identifies the "pivotal role" of the ABX, which by 2007, became "the focal
point of the crisis," and contributed directly to the end of the real estate
bubble.69 By increasing transparency for market pricing, the ABX made clear
that a large number of hedge funds were taking a bearish view of the subprime
mortgage market. The pricing of a trade-sensitive index immediately
incorporates and reflects trade information and by doing so, brings a level of
liquidity and transparency to a market.7 0 Once traders had incentives to express
their negative views about these assets through the public medium of the
index's prices, their opinions became the market's common knowledge.
Improved and accessible pricing increases the efficiency of markets. Index
prices may narrow trading spreads and lower barriers to entry. 71 At the margin,
some investors who have been deterred by high search costs may now be able
to join the market, benefiting personally and improving liquidity for others.
This increases liquidity for all participants, and so the value of the traded
assets.72
Information can also concentrate trading so as to generate important
network effects.73 Network effects are a form of economy of scale, in which
widespread adoption increases the total surplus. 74 Indices can help to establish
the index subject as the preferred contract or asset for traders, further increasing
its liquidity,75 and generating secondary research data and derivative
products. 7 6 Traders and investors flock to the S&P 500 index in part because of
benefits described above-low costs, diversification, and trusted judgmentbut also because others have flocked to it.

Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10, 31 (2009).
69.
Cf LUCAS ET AL., supra note 68.
70.
See Independent Price Assessment Data Helps Iron Ore Newcomer, Bahia Mineragdo,
71.
Mine for Competitive Intelligence, PLATTS (Oct. 2010), https://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/
InsightAnalysis/IndustrySolutionPapers/BahiaMineracaoCaseHistory.pdf.
J. Huston McCulloch, An Estimate of the Liquidity Premium, 83 J. POL. ECON. 95 (1975);
72.
Perry Mehrling & Daniel H. Neilson, A New Measure of Liquidity Premium (Jan. 31, 2008)
http://www.peri.umass.edulfileadmin/pdf/conferencepapers/d-aristal
manuscript),
(unpublished
liquiditydarista.PDF.
There is a vast literature on networks and standards. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY
73.
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (1988); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON 70 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatiability,75 AM. ECON. REv. 424 (1985).
74.

STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT 67 (2001)

("What most distinguishes networks from other instances of increasing returns is the benefits of
increased size come from the demand side, the willingness of consumers to pay, and not the supply side,
or the costs associated with production.").
75.

JoAo GARCIA & SERGE GOOSSENS, THE ART OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES: DEMYSTIFYING

THE BLACK SWAN § 18.2.1, at 150 (2010) ("Liquidity comes from the . . . use of the index as a
mechanism for pricing discovery and portfolio management of bespoke portfolios.").
See supra Part I.A.
76.
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B. Methodology & The Myth of Objectivity
We must clear some brushwork before indices can be properly understood.
The primary obstacle to such an understanding is a myth of objectivity, which
characterizes indices as near-Platonic mathematical constructs that exist largely
outside of human intervention and creativity. Yet, financial index production is a
fundamentally discretionary and subjective activity. Recognizing the inherent
discretion in financial index formation, we can seek solutions that improve the
exercise of human discretion, rather than purge it.
Despite the ubiquity of judgment, most commentators accept this myth of
objectivity, and its persistence obscures understanding of indices' promise and
failure.7 7 According to this view, indices are either themselves objective facts
or else factual statements about the world. For example, that the S&P 500 is
above 1000 is an observable, objective truth and one that does not rely on
human judgment or interpretation. An index number is an observable truth, like
the temperature. To the degree human choice is involved, there is only one
proper choice for those humans: correctly convey the fact as it is.
The myth of objectivity is common nowadays. Victor Goldberg, for
example, has stated, "Indexing has the advantage of being mechanical and
generally nonmanipulable." 79 But the myth has a long history. Irving Fisher, the
godfather of indexing, consistently speaks as though a given dataset can only
be fairly represented by a single, objectively correct index number:
If we look at prices as starting at any time from the same point, they seem to scatter or
disperse like the fragments of a bursting shell. But, just as there is a definite center of gravity
of the shell fragments, as they move, so is &re a definite average movement of the scattering
prices. This average is the "index number."

Fisher suggests that there is only one true index number summarizing the
data, and a functioning index should state it accurately. Within such a system,
ambiguity of construction methodology cannot be justified. As one industry
publication put it:
The methodology [of a good index] should be rules based and transparent. For instance,
the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 . . . seeks to measure the performance of all U.S. stocks on the

77.

On the social construction of the objectivity ideal, see THEODORE M. PORTER, TRUST IN

NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995).

78.

And yet, the temperature, too, has attracted attention as a subjective, social fact. See

ALBERT CAMUS, NOTEBOOKS 1935-1942, at 98 (Philip Thody tr., 1963) ("The temperature . . . is

something too fleeting to be established in mathematical concepts. Here, observations are arbitrary slices
of reality. And only the idea of an average enables us to offer an image of this reality.").
79. GOLDBERG, supra note 40, at 329.
80.
IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS 2-3 (3d ed. 1927); see also id. at 10 ("It
should be the 'just compromise' among conflicting elements, the 'fair average,' the 'golden mean."').
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primary exchanges. The methodology is based on pre-published rules and is transpsfnt, i.e.,
there is no ambiguity as to what makes a stock eligible to be included in the index.

As no proper index permits the sort of ambiguities that might require
judgment to interpret, there can be no justification for human intervention,
which would constitute overriding the mechanical rules.
Such pre-arranged rules are possible because the goal is clearaccuracy-and the means consist of whatever good statistical techniques will
deliver it. Fisher states that "[t]he fundamental purpose of an index number is
that it shall fairly represent . . . the many diverging ratios from which it is

calculated.'82 On this view, human discretion and creativity is anathema, and
index providers should let the data do the talking. Index creation is a
descriptive enterprise, not a normative one.
If this myth of objectivity were true, Libor would stand out as an
aberration and the source of Libor's problems would be clear: it broke all the
rules.
Libor is the average of the self-reported rates at which sixteen major
commercial banks are offered large unsecured loans.83 Libor is managed by the
British Bankers' Association (BBA),84 a trade association of UK banks, which
controls the composition of the panel and the Libor calculation methodology.85
The Libor exists for ten different currencies and for 15 different maturities,
varying from overnight to twelve months.86
Just before 11 a.m. each business day, a trader from each of the
contributor banks sends Thomson Reuters his answer to the following question:
at what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then
accepting inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am? 87
This question leaves much to interpretation: how much is "a reasonable
market size," for example? The bank treasurer has broad discretion about how
to interpret and answer many such questions, and need not keep her

81.
Francis Gupta, Indexes or Benchmarks:What's the Difference?, J. INDEXES, Nov./Dec.
2005, http://www.indexuniverse.com/publications/joumalofindexes/joi-articles/2049.html
(emphasis
added).
82.
FISHER, supra note 80, at 10.
83.
Actually, the number of banks changes from currency to currency and is not static.
Currently there are eighteen banks on the USD panel, U.S. Dollar Panel, BBA LIBOR,
http://www.bbalibor.com/panels/usd (last updated May 2012), but there were sixteen at the time of the
alleged manipulation, and there have been as many as twenty at one time. The Swedish krona, for
example, currently has only six panel banks. Swedish Krona Panel, BBA LIBOR,
http://www.bbalibor.com/panels/sek (last updated May 2012).
84.
Libor is directly managed by BBA Libor Ltd., a subsidiary of the BBA with an
independent board.
Understanding the Construction and Operation of BBA Libor-Strengthening for the
85.
Future, BRITISH BANKERS' ASS'N (June 10, 2008), http://www.aciforex.org/docs/markettopics/
20080610_BBA comments onLibor fixing.pdf.
86.
Id. § 3.1; Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/
bbalibor-explained/faqs (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
87.
The Basics, supra note 4.
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methodology the same from day to day, nor provide the BBA with an
explanation of the methodology.
For other questions, the BBA may provide guidance. Suppose a bank
received a cheap loan under very peculiar circumstances, perhaps from a client
trying to show a vote of confidence. Is that a reasonable basis on which to
submit a low quote? 88 Or suppose a bank is able to borrow from its government
at low rates during a time of crisis. Should that go into the Libor rate? 89
Ambiguities abound, some of which are resolved by the panel banks and some
of which are resolved by the BBA.
The submitted quotes are based on the bank's own private data, and the
bank is normally not required to substantiate its submission, but there is some
quality control. Of the quotes submitted, the interquartile mean is calculated by
discarding the four highest and lowest quotes and averaging the middle quotes.
The BBA can subject panel banks to inquiry for quotes that the staff-tipped
off by publicly available algorithms-determines to be suspicious. In principle,
a fraudulent quote could result in a bank's ejection from the panel, but
investigations are rare and no bank has ever been disciplined in that way.
Thus, Libor is calculated on the basis of a dozen or so banks' self-reported
estimates. The banks and the BBA use their judgment to interpret the question
and the data. There is substantial room for discretion and relatively little for
third-party oversight.
Numerous commentators have called for reform or regulation of Libor,
implicitly accepting the myth of objectivity as a background premise. For
example, Bloomberg CEO Daniel Doctoroff recently wrote: "Benchmarks such
as Libor that rely on subjective assessments . . . simply cannot accurately

reflect market realities." 90 If only Libor were objective like other indices, they
seem to suggest, the world would be much better.
Though distinguishing Libor as an outlier may be comforting, Libor is not
unique in incorporating subjective intervention and judgment into its process.
The subjectivity built into Libor, though surprising, is not itself the explanation
for any manipulative activity, since in several respects all indices-to greater
and lesser degrees-function the same way.

Yes, it is. Interview with John Ewan, Managing Director, BBA Libor (June 15, 2011).
88.
89.
No, it should not. Definitions, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbaliborexplained/definitions (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
90.
Daniel L. Doctoroff, Op-Ed., A Market Alternative to Libor,WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2012, at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443687504577563391057853800.html.
Al 1,
Doctoroff identifies other problems, including conflicts of interest, that do not implicate subjectivity. See
also Hannah Kuchler, BoE Governor Urges Reform of Libor, FIN. TIMES (June 29, 2012),
(reporting that Bank of
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a76a74a-cld2-llel-b76a-00144feabdcO.html
England governor believes that Libor should be based on actual transactions rather than estimate).
See Int'l Org. of Sec. Comnns, Discussion Paper on Benchmarks 4 (2012) (on file with
91.
author) (surveying the ubiquity of subjectivity in all indices and concluding that "[t]he criteria for
submitting data was not always objective, with many surveys calling for judgments and subjective rates
or prices. . .. The composition and rebalancing rules . .. seem to be largely discretionary.").
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First, index methodologies are goal-oriented, and require constant
updating in light of the index's goals. Human judgment is required to set the
index's goals and to evaluate methodologies that suit it. While Fisher conceived
of index providers as reporting on the single center of a moving pool of data,
real index production requires providers to take on the normative and
expressive task of defining the center.
Second, an index provider may legitimately decide to reduce the accuracy
of its index. In fact, index providers must balance a number of
incommensurable goods, including accuracy, tradability, and consistency.92 No
index can maximize every value, and index providers must make tradeoffs
among at least these three. Therefore, if two indices both purport to report on,
say, oil prices, we should not be surprised or offended if they deliver very
different answers about the market trends; constructing an index requires the
subjective choice of which values to vindicate, knowing the effect this will
have on users.
Third, the data never speaks for itself; human interpretation and editorial
content are ubiquitous in the daily function of indices, contrary to Goldberg's
characterization. Once an index's method and values are fixed, few indiceseven so-called "market-driven" indices--operate for long without human data
gathering or analysis.
1. Goal-Oriented Methodologies
Providing an index is a goal oriented activity. Operational challenges and
ambiguities can only be resolved by human beings with the index's object in
mind.93 To effectively steward an index is to be clear on what the index is
meant to represent. Contrary to myth, there is no "statistically correct" way to
transform data or maintain an index without consideration of what that index is
meant to convey and the purposes it will serve. 94
For example, the S&P 500 is an indicator and bellwether of blue-chip
America, meant to track the most significant large-capitalization firms in the

92.
More goals still can be imagined. The decennial census is conducted through a head-byhead count of Americans, rather than statistical sampling, even though the latter would probably be
cheaper and more accurate. Although some argue that this practice is preserved precisely in order to
undermine accuracy, see Press Release, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Supporting Plan for a Fair and Accurate
Census in 2000 (Apr. 1, 1998), http://pelosi.house.gov/pressarchives/releases/prcensus.htm, it may be
that this method privileges other values.
93.
Albert Neubert, Not So Fast, J. INDEXES, Nov./Dec. 2006, http://www.indexuniverse.com/
publications/journalofindexes/joi-articles/2317-not-so-fast.html (describing index invention and testing).
94.
For an early argument that indices are only the data they aggregate, without reference to
purpose, see WILLFORD I. KING, INDEX NUMBERS ELUCIDATED (1930). See also Milton Gilbert et al.,
Objectives ofNational Income Measurement:A Reply to ProfessorKuznets, 30 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 189
(1948) (arguing that there was no need to change the CPI as America moved from a focus on
production, during the Depression, to welfare in the early post-war period).
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leading U.S. industries.95 As companies grow and shrink, the dataset for
calculating such an index must change 96 and the appropriate changes are not
self-evident. The S&P 500 component companies tend to be large, but not the
largest 500 on the New York Stock Exchange.97 They are selected through
additional filters, all subject to human discretion. For example, the S&P 500
imposes profitability and domicile requirements, but its selection committee
waives them on a case-by-case basis for popular or important firms. 98
In addition to the selection criteria, the committee must decide on
selection frequency. If membership in the S&P 500 is changed only once per
century, it will become a reliquary of dead securities. Yet updating the pool of
firms every day would make it a "soup de jour" of American industry. There is
not one perfect rate of change, and each point on the spectrum reflects the
provider's judgment as to the index's purpose.
Interpretive discretion is essential even to indices self-described as rulegoverned and lacking in discretion.99 For example, Chinese firms have lately
obtained listings on U.S. exchanges by engineering acquisition by moribund,
yet still listed, U.S. companies.'0oo All indices that track U.S. companies,
including the Russell 3000, which prides itself on tracking the largest 3000
U.S. companies without exception, had to decide whether such firms continued
to be "U.S." companies.' 0'
Even seemingly mundane mathematical operations can involve profound
policy choices, and realizing that indices are goal-oriented can help one to
disentangle specious arguments for index "improvement." For instance, in
1996, a Senate-appointed commission identified "several categories or types of

95.
S&P 500 Equity Indices, S&P Dow JONES INDICES, http://www.standardandpoors.com/
indices/main/en/us (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
See Kelly Haughton, Provisionally Speaking, J. INDEXES, Jan./Feb. 2006,
96.
("Small-cap
http://www.indexuniverse.com/publications/journalofindexes/joi-articles/2329.html
managers once held Dell; however, it hardly fits that category any longer. Growth managers once held
Pfizer; today this stock is held primarily by value managers. Therefore, by nature, the indexes that
properly benchmark these active managers have higher turnover than the broad-market indexes.").
The largest 500 U.S.-domiciled companies are better found through the Fortune 500. For a
97.
comparison between the Fortune 500 and the S&P 500, see Robert Arnott & Li-Lan Kuo, Selection Bias,
J. INDEXES, Sept./Oct. 2011, http://www.indexuniverse.com/publications/joumalofindexes/joi-articles/
9743-selection-bias.html.
98. S&P U.S. Indices Methodology, STANDARD & POOR'S 5-7 (June 2012),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/articles/en/us/?articleType=PDF&assetlD= 1221189509652.
99. See also Emma Boyde, Index Providers Tweak Rules as Investors Raise Concerns, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2011, 1:08 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/O/bO2adf58-092e-llel-8e8600144feabdcO.html ('You have rules, but in the real world there will always be exceptions to the rules.
Rules have to evolve over time,' says Dimitris Melas, MSCI executive director and global head of new
product research.").
Id. ('We have had a huge amount of debate about what is and what is not a US
100.
company,' says [David] Blitzer [chairman of S&P's index committee], adding that it had been decided
that the Chinese companies were not.").
Id. ("However, Russell, despite its strict rule-based philosophy, still tweaked its rules
101.
after the slew of so-called backdoor listings by Chinese companies on to US markets. 'Sometimes things
catch you by surprise,' says [Russell's director of index research] . . . .").
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potential bias" in the CPI.102 The committee found that the CPI overstated
changes in the cost of living because consumers avoided many price increases
by substituting other goods. The committee also argued that price increases
may not sufficiently reflect increases in the quality and availability of new
goods.' 0 3 Even if the on-the-shelf price of mousetraps increases, for example,
they may be considerably better mousetraps than last year's model. It may
appear that the consumer pays more for the same, while she really pays more
for more. Thus, many price increases do not change consumer welfare or real
consumption.
Alan Greenspan testified before the congressional budget committees that
they could save $150 billion over five years by "correcting" CPI.' 0 4 Dale
Jorgenson estimated that the CPI's treatment of housing costs from 1968 to
1982 was an "error" that might be worth 25% of the federal deficit by the mid1990s. 105 As a result, in 1999 the Bureau of Labor Statistics began using a
geometric mean instead of an arithmetic mean to calculate the components of
the CPI.10 6 This fulfilled the Boskin Report's promise of more fairly
representing unrecorded improvements in consumer welfare.
Talk of correction and error fit well if one believes that there is a gold
standard by which methodologies are judged, and from which they can
objectively deviate.10 7 Yet, methodological shifts may also imply changes in
the index's purpose. As CPI adopted controls for unpriced quality increases, it
arguably transitioned from a consumer price index to a consumer welfare or
utility index. Prior to the Boskin Report, an increase in CPI represented an
increase in the cost of buying what consumers bought before, regardless of
whether their consumption had changed. Today, an increase in CPI represents
an increased cost of keeping consumers happy, through whatever purchases.

102.
See Boskin Report, supra note 23, at 7.
103.
This argument has long had its critics both as it relates to consumer satisfaction, Milton
Gilbert, Quality Changes and Index Numbers, 9 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 287, 291 (1961)
[hereinafter Gilbert, Quality Changes] (criticizing theory for implying that "if someone gives up
smoking and gets an equivalent sense of satisfaction from this self-denial, he has maintained his real
consumption and benefited from price decline"), and aggregate production, Milton Gilbert, Quality
Change and Index Numbers: The Reply, MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Bureau of Labor Statistics), May 1962,
at 544 [hereinafter Gilbert, Reply].
104.
Adam Clymer, As Parties Skirmish Over Budget, GreenspanOffers Painless Cure, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1995, at Al, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/11/us/104th-congress-overview-partiesskirmish-over-budget-greenspan-offers-painless.html.
Consumer Price Index: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 104th Cong. 2, 40
105.
(1995) (statement of Dale Jorgenson).
106.
Kenneth V. Dalton, John S. Greenlees & Kenneth J. Stewart, Incorporatinga Geometric
Mean FormulaInto the CPI, MONTHLY LAB. REv. (Bureau of Labor Statistics), Oct. 1998, at 3. But see
GETTING PRICES RIGHT, supra note 23 (disputing the Boskin Commission's estimates of bias and
concluding that the CPI may slightly understate inflation).
107.
See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 80, at 10.
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This represents a change in the goal of the index, rather than a correction of an
error. 08
The move to a geometric mean in the CPI lowered government outlays
and union wages, while raising taxes, a result with significant political valence.
This is why changes in index methodology can stir opposition from those with
little interest in perfecting the science of statistics. Bill Gross, founder and coCIO of PIMCO, the world's largest bond fund described the change: "The CPI
as calculated may not be a conspiracy, but it's definitely a con job foisted on an
unwitting public . .. ,109 Labor unions, long involved in index policy, opposed
the change. 1 0 Alterations in index methodology create winners and losers
among those who relied on the previous methodology. The possibility for these
shifts is an intrinsic part of index production. Ultimately, the shifts in CPI
illustrate how data selection and methodology are nested within an index's
purpose, and how it is impossible to judge its propriety without reference to
them.
2. Accuracy: One Virtue Among Many
Even if it is clear what an index is attempting to illustrate-be it consumer
price, consumer welfare, or whatever else-it may seem that accurate portrayal
of that subject is singularly good. Yet, it is both common and essential for
index providers to deliberately reduce the accuracy of their index. In fact, all
indices exist on a benchmarking spectrum where accuracy is balanced against
an index's other legitimate goals, including tradability and consistency. To pick
a place on that spectrum is to make a policy choice about what social benefits
an index is meant to realize and who its key constituents are. Contrary to myth,
there is no ideal level of accuracy for an index without consideration of whom
the index is meant to serve and how.
Recall that indices are used as investment blueprints, contract referents,
and information sources. These uses place different values on accuracy. Want
to know the state of the Polish economy so that you can decide whether to start
a new restaurant in Warsaw? There is an index that can help you."' But that
same index might let another user, a fund manager, set up a fund representing

Nor does it represent the creationof an error, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary.
108.
For an argument against such an approach as a reflection of consumer utility, see Gilbert, Quality
Changes, supra note 103, at 291; for an argument against it as a reflection of aggregate production, see
Gilbert, Reply, supra note 103, at 544-45.
109.
Bill Gross, Haute Con Job, INVESTMENT OUTLOOK (Oct. 2004), http://www.pimco.com/
EN/Insights/Pages/lO_Oct 2004.aspx.
See STAPLEFORD, supra note 50, at 356 (2009) ("Union economists recognized (how
110.
could they not?) that the main effect of adopting a constant-utility approach would be to lower the index
to adjust for alleged consumer substitution, new kinds of goods, and the quality improvements that were
(supposedly) missed by current methods.").
111.
Warsaw
Stock
Exchange
WIG
Total
Return
Index,
BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/WIG:ND (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
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the Polish economy. For the restaurateur, an accurate, up-to-date index would
be of great value. For a fund manager, though, a continuously updating
snapshot of the Polish economy could be a terrible index. That is because funds
care about transaction costs and transactions costs may be inversely correlated
with accuracy.
Beyond mere brokerage fees, index funds suffer enormous costs due to
opportunistic arbitrageurs. When an index announces that a given company will
be added to the index, index funds are obliged to purchase the company. Index
funds typically rebalance their portfolio when the change becomes effective,
rather than when it is announced. Arbitrageurs, however, are free to bid up (or
down) the price of the security from the date of the announcement, knowing
full well that many index funds will soon need to buy or sell the security. The
result is that index funds pay more when they buy and receive less when they
sell than they otherwise would. The costs of this arbitrage are enormous.2 By
contrast, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has made no changes since 2009,
and only 48 in its 115-year history. Its accuracy as a bellwether is sometimes
disputed, but the transaction costs of use are small. Different users may prefer
different tradeoffs between accuracy and consistency, given the costs the latter
creates.
There are also potential tradeoffs between accuracy and tradability. The
Warsaw fund covers all listed Polish companies. Some of these companies may
be small and thinly traded. It may be difficult for the fund manager to buy the
representative quantity of shares prescribed by the index without affecting the
price of the shares. A fund manager might be pleased if the index left off small,
illiquid assets at the expense of accuracy.
Tradability and consistency also matter to those who use financial indices
as contract referents. Consider how Platts modifies its benchmarks over time.
Oil from the Ekofisk region of the North Sea has traditionally traded for a
higher price, and traded separately from Oseberg, Forties, and Brent oils. In
2007, Platts decided to include Ekofisk oil with the other three into its Brent
index,113 which acts as the settlement price of NYMEX Brent futures.114
Though Ekofisk is chemically different from the others and generally trades at
higher prices, including it increased the volume of oil within the category,
which improved liquidity. Platts made a policy tradeoff between being an

112.
One study found that index fund investors in the Russell 2000 alone lost $560 million, or
1.30% of their value,peryear due to arbitrage effects. Honghui Chen, Gregory Noronha & Vijay Singal,
Index Changes and Losses to Index Fund Investors, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 31, 35 (2006). Loss statistics
rise precipitously if assets non-passively indexed to the Russell 2000 are included ($4.86 billion per
year), or if arbitrage statistics for passively indexed S&P 500 funds are included ($1.32 billion per year).
Id. at 35-37.
113.
Bassam Fattouh, An Anatomy of the Crude PricingSystem 38 (Oxford Inst. for Energy
Studies Working Paper No. 40, 2011), http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/201 1/
03/WPM40-AnAnatomyoftheCrudeOilPricingSystem-BassamFattouh-201 I.pdf.
114.
Brent 25-Day (Platts) Futures, CME GROuP, http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/
energy/crude-oil/brent-25-day-platts-futures contract specifications.html (last visited March 3, 2012).
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accurate benchmark of Brent, faithfully tracking the represented material, and
redefining Brent to improve tradability for Brent-traders.
Frequent and comprehensive updating is valuable for users who use the
index as a source of information, but it is injurious to users who employ the
index as a blueprint for an investment strategy. Index providers are
conscientious of the tradeoff between accuracy, which they call
"benchmarking," and tradability and consistency, which are together called
"investability."" 5 An index cannot be a perfect benchmark and perfectly
investable, so providers must run their index with one or more constituencies in
mind.
Parties may disagree with the many ways that index providers exercise
their judgment and discretion, but judgment itself is essential to the operation
of indices and important for the benefits they provide-particularlyin those
cases where reasonable people might disagree. 1 6 This understanding of
indexing illustrates the virtues of the price term at issue in Gulf Oil."' In that
case, the parties agreed to use Platts's West Texas Sour oil price in their supply
contract. The market fractured when the government eased price controls on oil
production in excess of 1972 levels. Chemically identical oils, which may even
have come from the same well, could suddenly command a higher price in the
market because of regulatory status. Unfortunately for Gulf Oil, Platts excluded
the new oil's sale prices from its existing oil price index." 8
A decision as to relevance had to be made by Platts, and no mechanical
operation could serve this function. This judgment may actually have been one
reason the parties used the Platts price in their contract. The parties left to Platts
the task of trading off accuracy, tradability, and consistency for them. Is "new
oil" part of the market for West Texas Crude? Reasonable parties could
disagree, but by excluding it, Platts provided an answer informed by its sense
of what tradeoffs Platts's users would want and expect.
Indeed, to index users, indices' imbedded discretion may be their greatest
virtue, rather than a vice. Parties may wish to outsource decision making to the
index provider, which is likely an industry expert with a reputation for the
values it weighs in responding to change. The value of indices in contracts thus
depends on their ability to accommodate change through judgment and
discretion.

115.
Telephone interview with David Blitzer, Managing Director and Chairman of the Index
Committee, S&P Dow Jones Indices (Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Blitzer interview]; telephone interview
with Alex Matturri, Chief Executive Officer, S&P Dow Jones Indices (Dec. 19, 2011).
116.
See Verstein, supranote 47.
117.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 433 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
118.
Id. at 434.
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3. Data: No Mathematics Without Judgment
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chairman Gary
Gensler has stated: "To be reliable, indices have to be transaction-based and
transparent." 1 l9 Yet, even transaction-based indices are mediated by human
editors who organize their data into categories.
For instance, Platts has provided market-based oil price data, based on
actual transactions, for more than one hundred years. Yet its editors do not
contact every oil buyer and seller in order to ascertain prices; they must be
selective in how they obtain and weigh data in order to control submission
quality. Moreover, editors estimate the value of irregular or unsold supply
where price data is not yet available.120 Platts even provides an index value "in
the complete absence of trade."'21
The data that index providers gather, and how they organize it, represents
subjective judgments about the market. The decision to count many things
separately or instead to combine them into one category is a subjective
judgment about the relevance of their similarities and differences, for which
there can be no neutral approach. While Platts once tabulated Ekofisk prices
separately from Brent, considering it sufficiently distinct as to warrant its own
category in the ledger, Platts now includes Ekofisk as just one type of oil within
its Brent index. This change necessarily involved editors' sense that Ekofisk
was, or had become, conceptually similar to the other oils in the index. The
ways in which data is gathered and organized can have profound implications
for the subsequent analysis of that data.12 2 The normative judgments required to
organize data acquisition in this way inevitably influence analysis by the
provider and the public.
Daily data interpretation involves market savvy and judgment. Each day
NYMEX must calculate the closing prices of commodities traded on its
exchange. Sometimes this is impossible because, in NYMEX's opinion, there
are simply too few trades to make an assessment.' 23 The day's closing market
price cannot be obtained simply by checking the last sale of the day, because
this might represent a peculiar trade that did not accurately reflect the market.
But prioritizing trades that reflect the market requires a normative judgment of

Peter Eavis & Nathaniel Popper, Libor Scandal Shows Many Flaws in Rate-Setting, N.Y.
119.
TIMES DEALBOOK (July 19, 2012, 7:34 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/libor-scandalshows-many-flaws-in-rate-setting/.
See The Western World's Unsung 'Energy Czar,' I1 NAT'L J. 1279, 1279 (1979) ("Each
120.
business day, [the Platts editorial director] issues his judgments of the approximate value of oil around
the world: a cargo of Saudi Arabian crude in Singapore, a tanker of gasoline in the Bahamas, a
bargeload of heating oil in Rotterdam.").
121.
Platt-ICE Relationship: Frequently Asked Questions, PLATTS, http://www.platts.com/
IM.Platts.Content/productsservices/products/icefaq.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
122.
PORTER, supra note 77, at 41-42.
N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.
123.
2007).
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what the normal market ought to look like. In those cases, NYMEX's "work
appears closer to creation, to making predictions of expected values."l 2 4
Subjective judgment is likewise present in weighting data. For example, a
company issuing warrants-rights to purchase stock-may see its share price
decline due to simple dilution. An index provider will try to negate any dilutive
change in stock price, to prevent a cosmetic change from influencing the index
output value. Yet, it is also possible that the drop in the share price reflects the
market's belief that issuing warrants is unwise. Thus, even simply
incorporating public stock prices requires index providers to parse conflicting
interpretations and form opinions about which corporate decisions are cosmetic
and which are unwise. Index providers utilize powerful mathematical systems,
but human interpretation is creative and determinative in daily operations.
II. How Indices Fail
A. Taxonomy

The number and variety of indices is daunting, and it may seem that it is
impossible to organize them or even define their boundaries. This Part develops
a taxonomy of financial indices with the explanatory power to illuminate the
different motivations for index production, the risk profiles attendant to
different indices, and the applicable solutions to those risks. This grammar of
index analysis shows the interconnections between index motivations, risks,
and solutions and provides a roadmap for preventing index failures. Appendix
A provides a summary chart of this taxonomy.
Broadly speaking, there are three basic forms of indices. Public indices,
such as the WPI, GDP, and corporate governance indices, all serve a public
purpose of providing information without the ambition to recoup profits. These
public-minded indices are policy-oriented and responsive to their creators'
agendas rather than profit. Many are provided by the government, but
universities, non-profits, and individuals also provide public indices.
Product index providers create indices as their primary business. They
provide the index and seek to earn profits by charging users for the privilege of
the index's use. They make and sell their product-indices-just as other firms
make and sell widgets. The S&P 500 and Platts are both product indices.
Byproduct index providers produce the index as an incident to some other
profit-making activity.125 For example, the Libor panel banks help to create
Libor and the New York Mercantile Exchange creates the NYMEX index, but
neither is primarily motivated by the desire to sell the use of their index.

124.
Id. at 116.
125.
On the distinction between production and byproduction, see Bruce H. Kobayashi &
Larry E. Ribstein, Law as a ByProduct: Theories of Private Law Production (Illinois Law, Behav. &
Soc. Sci. Research, Research Paper No. LBSSI 1-27), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884985.
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International banks have always used Libor to support other products-at first
loans, and now swaps-rather than as a standalone product. Byproduct indices
exist in order to serve some alternative commercial purpose of their providers,
and their creators may not even consider themselves to be in the indexing
business.
The explanatory power of this taxonomy resides in its ability to illuminate
the interconnections between index producer motivations, index risks, and
index solutions.
B. ProviderMotivation

In this Part, we survey the different motivations for index production. We
show that specific producer motivations can be broadly understood as driving
the taxonomy outlined above and as defining each index model.
1. Share
Some index providers wish to share the information with others. The most
important producer of such indices is the government. The Senate resolved in
1902 to create the earliest federal index, a progenitor of the Producer Price
Index, to investigate the effects of tariff laws upon trade, development,
production, and prices.1 26 Since that time, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
("BLS") has provided dozens of indices such as the Consumer Price Index,
meant to inform "sound decisions in Government and business, or at home, the
store, the bank, or just about anywhere."1 27 Thus, a provider may seek to spread
the informational benefits described in Subsection I.A.3 to the index's users. A
provider that cares about the coordination problems of others may create an
index to spread the benefits discussed in Subsection I.A.2. And contractors
frequently make use of CPI as a referent functioning as a price term within the
contract.128
In addition to facilitating contracting, providers sometimes wish to
empower others to discuss and research in a particular way. For example,
academic corporate governance indices facilitate investigations into the role of
certain corporate bylaw amendments with the goal of advancing the debate
within a broad academic community.1 29 Index providers may even be pleased if

126.

S. COMM. ON FIN., WHOLESALE PRICES, WAGES, AND TRANSPORTATION, S. REP. NO.

1394, pt. I (1893); U.S. Department of Labor, Course of Wholesale Prices, 1890-1901, Bulletin No. 39,
March 1902, at 205-09.

127.

What BLS Does, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., http://www.bls.gov/jobs/aboutbls.htm (last

visited Aug. 28, 2012).

128.
How to Use the Consumer Price Index for Escalation, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS.,
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpil998d.htm (last modified Oct. 16, 2001) ("Escalation agreements often use
the CPI-the most widely used measure of price change-to adjust payments for changes in prices.").
129.
See generally Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance
Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1803 (2008).
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investors use the index as a blueprint for investment, following Subsection
I.A. 1.130

We generally associate an information objective with public indices.
When the information is shared with users, the public index provider delivers
many of the benefits described in Part I, sometimes at great cost, 3 1 but without
charging for use of its brand, method, or data. This combination of intentional
direct production of the index and the absence of index monetization is the
hallmark of the public index provider. This is why few public index providers
are for-profit firms. Enabling others without explicitly charging is the sort of
public good that governments and universities typically desire to produce.
2. Sell
Many of the best-known indices, such as the Dow Jones Industrial
Average and the S&P 500, are created primarily as products for sale. Their
producers are in the indexing business. Users who want to enjoy the benefits
described in Part I may be willing to pay for the use of an index's trademarks,
settlement value, methodology, or data.
Many funds are pleased to use indices as blueprints for investment and
pay a corresponding fee.1 32 Some funds, such as ETFs, are required under the
Investment Company Act to license their index from an unaffiliated thirdparty,133 ensuring a captive audience for index sellers.
An index's output value can be used as a settlement value upon which to
construct financial instruments, such as options on the S&P 500, as described in
Subsection I.B. 1. It is common for options exchanges to pay large commissions
for the right to offer index options to their trading customers. Users also pay for
information. For more than 100 years, Platts, which produces an industry
respected oil price index, has been supported by subscription fees to its pricing
services.134 Even where the underlying data is otherwise available, indices may
charge substantial sums for their aggregation and analysis.135
130.

See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate

Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 823-24 (2009).

131.
FY 2012 Congressional Budget Justification, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (2012),
http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2012/PDF/CBJ-2012-V3-01.pdf [hereinafter FY 2012 Congressional
Budget Justification] (noting that the CPI is calculated through the primary research of thousands of
employees, costing half a billion dollars annually).
132.
Vanguard's S&P 500 Exchange Traded Fund markets itself with the S&P 500 product
name and uses the S&P 500's calculation methodology to select its investments.
133.
Application for Exemption Under Section 6(c) at 21-22, In re Guggenheim Funds (Dec.
15,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/l 167303/000089180411005522/gugg5312240app.htm; Guggenheim Joins Self-Indexing Trend, INDEX UNIVERSE (Dec. 21, 2011, 2:55 PM),
http://www.indexuniverse.eu/europe/news/8129-guggenheim-joins-self-indexingtrend.html?Itemid=129.
134.
See, e.g., Fox Rubin, ICE to Distribute PlattsServices, Products Starting in 2012, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2011, 10:18 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20111207-708751.html.
135.
MSCI
Inc.,
Annual
Report (Form
10-K)
at 52 (Jan.
31, 2011),
http://apps.shareholder.com/sec/viewerContent.aspx?companyid=MSCI&docid=7680285
[hereinafter
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It is possible to make ballpark estimates of the rewards providers claim for
their indices. S&P charges an iShares fund a license fee of .0308% of fund
value. For 2010, that meant almost $22 million from just one fund, for just
one index. S&P reports $1.25 trillion indexed to its indices.' If it charges
similar fees on that entire amount, S&P would make $400 million in annual
revenue from indexing.1 39
Further estimates can be divined from MSCI, the only major index
provider that makes regular public filings. If its financial information is any
indication, then the indexing business is thriving. In 2010, MSCI made $350
million in revenue from index-type products.140 This represented a 52%
increase in revenue from 2008.141 Revenues have increased largely because of
an increase in the assets under management of subscribing funds.14 2 The
ascendancy of indexed investing has been good for index providers and
indexing is currently a high-margin business.14 3 It is profoundly scalable,
requiring little marginal investment to maintain another index product similar
' 44
to an existing one.
3. Use
A third category of index is made for use by a provider that seeks the
benefits discussed in Part I. A provider may wish to blueprint its own
investments, or create an index term by which to settle its own contracts, or
maintain the information gleaned in index production.

MSCI Annual Report] (reporting that two thirds of the $350 million in indexing revenue MSCI earned in
2010 came from the sale of data).
136.
SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust Prospectus, STANDARD & POOR'S 6 (Jan. 25, 2012),
https://www.spdrs.com/library-content/public/SPY%20Prospectus.pdf [hereinafter Prospectus]. S&P
also receives a fixed annual payment of $600,000. Id. at 25-26. This is an appreciable increase from the
early days of index licensing. In S&P's earliest contract with Vanguard, the latter agreed to pay a mere
$5000 per year for the use of all the S&P 500 data and trademarks. McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Vanguard
Index Trust, 139 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549-550 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
137.
Application for Exemption Under Section 6(c), supra note 136, at 17.
3.
John Davies, S&P INDICES, Using ETF's for Strategic Portfolio Construction,
http://us.spindices.com/documents/presentations/20120705-presentation-davies-sp-indices-using-etfsstrategic-portfolio-construction.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2012).
S&P's total 2010 revenue was $2.9 billion. Key Statistics, STANDARD & POOR'S,
139.
http://www.standardandpoors.com/about-sp/key-statistics/en/us (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
MSCI Annual Report, supranote 135, at 52.
140.
141.
Id.
Id. at 62 ("The growth [in revenue from index asset-based fees] was attributable to the
142.
growth in the average value of assets in ETFs linked to MSCI equity indices."); Guggenheim Joins SelfIndexing Trend, supra note 133 ("Many such arrangements are based on a percentage of assets a fund
accumulates. That was perfectly amenable in a world of upstart firms and funds, but looks much less
compelling these days, when a growing number of funds are multibillion dollar juggernauts.").
Telephone interview with Alex Matturri, CEO of S&P Dow Jones Indices (Dec. 19,
143.
2011).
144.
Id.
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This may be because an index user has decided that it would be nice to
avoid the costs of licensing an index. Index licensing amounted to about one
third of iShares's total cost to investors, greater than all other expenses except
for the manager's fee.145 iShares may suspect that it could make its own index
for a fraction of the $22 million it pays S&P. Increasingly, funds are requesting
permission from the SEC to make their own indices for their own use.146 The
prominent Russell indices are produced by Russell Investments, which then
offers funds that rely on them. 147 Other fund advisors are purchasing index
providers.148 Not only may creating an in-house index be cheaper than paying a
licensing fee, it may also be more discreet. A fund manager may wish to run its
own indices, keeping the methodology secret, in order to avoid arbitrageurs and
copycats.149 To the degree the SEC allows these exemptions, increasingly many
indices will be produced for internal use, rather than sale.'50
More often, an index is made for use when nothing on the market quite
fits the needs of the user-provider, and she may be best positioned to develop
the index. Libor is one example of an index made to suit the users' contracting
needs.
Volatile interest rates in the 1980s drove banks to make variable-rate
loans. At first, many floating-rate consumer and some commercial loans would
be set in relation to prime,' 5 but as early as the mid-1980s, financial
institutions found that offshore interbank rates more closely tracked their own
borrowing costs, and that basing loans and derivatives on these rates would
reduce their funding risks.152 Rather than borrowing from U.S. depositors, the
federal government, or other U.S. banks, there was a general move to borrow
U.S. dollars from accounts that were legally located abroad, and bank loans
increasingly incorporated these funding rates as the variable rate.

145.
MSCI Annual Report, supra note 135.
146.
Section 6(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 permits the SEC to exempt persons,
securities, or transactions where it serves the public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (2006).
147.
See,
e.g.,
HBTA Russell
10000 High
Beta
ETF,
RUSSELL
ETFs,
http://russelletfs.com/Products/HBTAOvcrview.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (offering an ETF that
seeks investment results that closely correspond to a Russell-produced index).
148.
Alex Ulam, Van Eck Acquires Market Vectors Indices, INDEX UNIVERSE (Nov. 30, 2011),
http://www.indexuniverse.com/sections/news/ 0278-van-eck-acquires-market-vectors-indices-.html
("The deal means Van Eck will now be paying licensing fees to a subsidiary instead of an outside
company.").
149.
This is the argument of BlackRock, which currently seeks SEC permission to produce inhouse indices for its funds. Application for an Order Under Section 6(c), In re BlackRock Fund
Advisors (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1006249/000119312511239094/
d4Oapp.htm.
150.
The ability to use in-house indices is partially to credit for the appeal of so-called
"structured products."
151.
Prime, or the prime interest rate, runs about 300 basis points above the federal funds rate,
which is the interest rate at which funds on deposit at the Federal Reserve are loaned among banks.
152.
Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank Rate Fixings During the Recent
Turmoil, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2008, at 59, 60.
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Early on, the interest rates on these loans were set based on the cost of
funds of the lending banks themselves. So if a syndicate were formed to
collectively make a large loan, the loan rate might be written to equal the
average cost of funds of all the members of the syndicate.153 Because the
syndicate would largely borrow in the offshore interbank market, this syndicate
rate provided the banks with a measure of security that their funding costs
would stay in line with their lending revenues.
However, it was inefficient to calculate these figures for every transaction,
collecting data from every lending bank. In 1984, U.K. banks requested that the
BBA develop a method to publicly determine the interest rates on syndicated
loans.15 4 This BBA method, which would become BBA Libor, proved an
attractive shortcut in syndicated lending, largely approximating the funding
costs for the participant banks but at much lower cost and greater liquidity. By
lending at a rate that aggregated their own costs of borrowing, banks could
ensure that the rates at which they lent kept a close relationship to their own
borrowing rates. Within two years, this preliminary rate had taken on a form
very similar to today's Libor and had been so named. 55 Increasingly,
syndicates referenced the BBA Libor.
Gradually, Libor's dominance moved beyond syndicated lending to
encompass all short-term lending contracts. Banks link auto, home, and student
loans to Libor. Corporate borrowers hedge or speculate on interest rate
movements by buying Libor-linked derivatives, and banks willingly provide
them.156 Libor is an index that was made from the beginning for use by its
providers and not for sale.' 57
Where an index is produced for use by the provider, it will almost
inevitably be a byproduct index. Whatever the provider uses the index for will
be the product for which the index is produced. For Libor, the banks make
money for loans and swaps, and they produce Libor as a means of facilitating
that business.
4. Require
In some circumstances, a firm may be required to produce an index,
sometimes as a result of direct legal regulation. For instance, the New York
Mercantile Exchange calculates trade settlement prices by virtue of its status as

Richard M. Gray, Libor Market Disruption,MILBANK, TWEED, HADLEY & MCCLOY LLP
153.
4 (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.milbank.com/images/content/6/8/688/LIBORMarketDisruption.pdf.
Mollenkamp, supra note 1.
154.
155.
The Basics, supra note 4; Carsella, supra note 5, at 48.
156.

See THE HANDBOOK OF CURRENCY AND INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 2-10

(Robert J. Schwartz & Clifford W. Smith, Jr. eds., 1990).
156.
Carsella, supranote 5, at 48.
The BBA does make a small amount from providing data access, but this dwarfs the
157.
importance of Libor for lending and derivatives.
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an exchange, and those values constitute an index upon which other financial
products may be based. 58
In these cases, the provider does not intend to use the index, to sell it, or to
benevolently provide it to the commons. Instead, the index is produced as a
necessary step in some other profit-oriented activity. As such, they are like usemotivated indices in that they only arise as byproduct indices.1 5 9
C. Risks ofIndices
In the sections below, we argue that financial indices face three principal
forms of risk: manipulation, underproduction, and malproduction. In other
words, index users may be harmed by affirmative misuse, a dearth of indices,
or by the low quality of the indices available. We contend that an account of
risk that goes beyond manipulation risk is vital, because many solutions to
manipulation actually exacerbate underproduction or malproduction.
Crucially, we show that different index types are vulnerable to different
types of risk. Each index type can suffer each type of problem, but the relative
likelihood and the optimal solution differs and depends on the motivation of the
index provider. Though no one index type is best in all cases, we show that
product indices have desirable features that are often underappreciated and that
public and byproduct indices are problematic in ways not always considered.
1. Manipulation
The manipulation of a financial index-deliberate intervention in the
index's inputs, methodology or output to suit the manipulator's interests at the
expense of most users-is the most intuitively worrisome form of index failure.
We show examples of manipulation from each index type, but we begin with
Libor, a byproduct index.
Three theories may explain why panel banks might attempt to manipulate
Libor. The "reputational" account suggests that the panel banks were lowballing their quotes in order to appear less financially vulnerable than they
were.160 Libor quotes are public, so if a bank reported increasing borrowing
costs, it would telegraph that lenders were avoiding the bank. During the crisis,
no one wanted to be "the next Lehman," and banks had a strong incentive to lie
about borrowing costs in order to protect their image. This theory is consistent
with the fact that anomalous Libor quotes were generally too low.
According to a second manipulation theory, the "positional" account,
banks extracted profit from their clients by manipulating the rate upon which

158.
NYMEX, 497 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2007).
159.
Indeed, both use-production and required-production are conceptually related examples
of byproduction.
160.
See Mollenkamp, supra note 1.
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their derivative positions were based. If one bank lends more with contracts
referencing Libor than it borrows, then it will profit if Libor goes up, and viceversa.
Many commentators are skeptical that banks would have a consistent nonzero net Libor position.1 61 Yet substantial net positions, correlated with the
direction of rate irregularities, are exactly what Snider and Youle found. In the
first quarter of 2009, Citigroup reported that it "would make $936 million in net
interest revenue if interest rates would fall by 25 basis points a quarter over the
next year and $1,935 million if they were to fall 1 percent instantaneously."l62
The source of such large positions, and their unexpected appearance, was
banks' extensive swap operations.
Snider and Youle's findings support the positional theory. They compared
banks' swap exposure, as reported to the Fed, to their implied degree of
misreporting of borrowing costs.163 Suggestively, Snider and Youle found that
where Citi had a larger net exposure to Libor, and therefore stood to gain more
from a change in Libor, it tended to make larger anomalous quotes. Even more
tellingly, Citi had different exposures to different currencies. A rise in Yen
Libor would benefit Citi, just as a drop in dollar Libor would hurt Citi.
Consistent with a positional theory, Citi's Libor quotes in each currency were
often in the same direction that would benefit it.
Both the positional and reputational versions of Libor disruption tend to
view manipulation as coming from the top,'1 but recent details emerging from
regulatory investigations suggest a third manipulation theory: the banks may
have had poor internal controls, allowing individual traders to manipulate Libor
to benefit their own trades. In this "rogue trader" theory, traders enter into
small conspiracies with a bank's quote submitters, rather than industry-wide
cartels. For example, Barclays Capital's recent settlement with the CFTC
indicates that certain swap traders made manipulative requests of the banks'
rate submitters.1 65
Banks may, as a whole, lose money from rogue trader manipulation. The
Canadian investigation into Royal Bank of Scotland suggests that a bank's

161.
Duncan Wood, Libor Fix?, RISK MAGAZINE, July 1, 2011, at 40, http://www.risk.net/
risk-magazine/feature/2081957/libor-fix.
162.
Snider & Youle, supra note 14, at 12; see also Abrantes-Metz et al., supranote 22, at 897
("Based on our evidence, biased signals coming from the individual banks (agent aggregation bias), rate
manipulation or collusion appear as one likely answer.").
163.
This data is found on Report FR Y-9C, published by the Federal Reserve Board, which
must be completed by certain bank holding companies.
164.
See, e.g., Supplemental Information Regarding Barclays Settlement with the Authoritieg
in Respect of Their Investigations into the Submission of Various Interbank Offered Rates (AMENDED),
BARCLAYS 6 (July 3, 2012, 6:10 PM), http://group.barclays.com/news/news-article/l329926004178/
navigation-1330349038798 (noting that the President of Barclays Capital may have ordered
subordinates to submit lower Libor quotes).
165.
Barclays Non-ProsecutionAgreement, Appendix A: Statement of Facts, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST. 5 (June 26, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9312012710173426365941.pdf.
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traders might request help from a voice broker in tampering with rates.' 66 These
brokers help banks to raise money in the money market, and their complicity
might make it easier to persuade an unwitting bank treasurer that their potential
funding costs actually warrant a higher or lower Libor quote. The bank could
borrow at a higher price than warranted, or other traders at the bank could lose,
because traders wished to improve their own books.16 7
It is sometimes thought that Libor would be difficult to manipulate
because the top and bottom quartile of quotes are eliminated.168 So, the
argument goes, it would take collusion of more than a quarter of the banks to
have any impact on the Libor output value.169 This makes manipulation less
likely to succeed, and employee-driven manipulation less likely still.
Yet it is far easier to manipulate Libor than it may appear. No conspiracy
is required if each bank individually expects to benefit by submitting a false
quote. Under the reputational theory, any bank benefits from lowballing its
quote, regardless of whether it influences the final quote. As John Ewan, the
BBA officer in charge of Libor put it:
It's like a school of fish. When a shark pops up, they all jink at exactly the same moment. You
think they are acting in coordination, but they are not. They are all seeing the same stimulus,
and reacting in the same way. They want to stay in the school, preferably in the middle of the
school bepse that is the way they are most likely to not be eaten by a shark. That's not
collusive.

It is not collusive, but it may be manipulative, and the net result could be an
artificial rate.
More importantly, any single bank may influence the Libor even if no
other bank has the same idea. Any bank that moves the middle of the pack
closer to the outer quartile will affect the average, and any bank that arrives in
the excluded outer quartile may push another quote in that would have
previously been excluded. This means that any bank may manipulate the Libor

166.
See Michael Mackenzie, Libor Probe Shines Light on Voice Brokers, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2012, 8:45 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/51abc870-57ee-llel-bf61-00144feabdcO.html;
Caroline Binham, Brooke Masters & Megan Murphy, Brokers Suspended in Libor Inquiry, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 8, 2012, 9:31 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7021cdb4-527a-llel-ae2c-00144feabdcO.html; see
also Application for Order of Additional Production, In re Inquiry Under the Competition Act (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J. June 9, 2011) (on file with author) (detailing inquiry into potential conspiracy).
167.
The bank or its traders can also profit by providing information, or influence of the rate,
to third party traders like hedge funds. This suggests both that extraction can arise from insufficient
oversight of unauthorized employee activity, and that extractions can occur through beneficial
relationships with other investors, even if the index provider itself did not seek to benefit from its own
trading positions.
168.
See, e.g., Jacob Gyntelberg & Philip Wooldridge, Interbank Rate Fixings During the
Recent Turmoil, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2008, at 59, 65 (asserting that manipulation is possible if "contributor
banks collude or if a sufficient number change their behavior.").
169.
See, e.g., Donia O'Loughlin, At Least Five Banks Manipulated Libor, Boulger, FIN.
TIMES ADVISOR, July 4, 2012, http://www.ftadviser.com/2012/07/04/regulation/regulators/at-least-fivebanks-manipulated-libor-boulger-wIGNdInYsSTUiZ9CMYtgfl/article.html.
170.
Interview with John Ewan, Managing Director, BBA Libor (June 15, 2011).
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rate in at least one direction unilaterally, notwithstanding the exclusion rule.
50% can move it in either direction, 25% can manipulate it only upward, and
25% can move it only downward.' 7 1 Thus, in a given direction, at least 75% of
the panel banks may unilaterally affect the average by moving the quote in their
preferred direction.172 Thus it is false to say, as many do, that it would have
required coordination amongst more than a quarter of the banks in order to
manipulate Libor. Such coordination would be necessary to ensure
manipulation power in any direction, but any individual bank can unilaterally
move prices in at least one direction.173 And a bank with a robust net position
would have a strong incentive to misrepresent, without requiring any collusion.
Regardless of the reason, however, the manipulation of Libor is intimately
connected with its status as a byproduct. Byproduct providers have several
structural features that make manipulation more likely. First, they tend to draw
on privately available data, such as the bank's own funding information. That
171.
Imagine a panel of eight banks A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H, with "true" costs of
1,2,3,4,5,6,7, and 8, respectively, which is their Libor quote on Day 1. Banks C, D, E, and F are included
as the middle band and A, B, G, and H are excluded as outliers, so Day l's Libor output is
((3+4+5+6)/4) or 4.5 On Day 2, none of their costs change. Which banks can manipulate the daily
Libor? Surely, C, D, E, and F can each individually manipulate the outcome either by increasing or
decreasing their quote (3+4+5+6 +/- n)/4= 4.5 +/- n/4. Of course, there is a limit to how much
manipulation can be achieved in this way. If C lowers its quote to 1 from 3, it will cease to be part of the
middle band. Its quote will be excluded by virtue of being in the bottom quartile. However, B's quote
will no longer be part of the outlier pack. The included panel will be B, D, E, and F with quotes 2, 4, 5,
and 6, respectively, and the day's Libor quote will be 17/4, or 4.25. To be sure, C's manipulation was
blunted by the exclusion rule, since she lowered her quote to 1, but the value submitted to the average
dropped only to 2. But she was still able to unilaterally move the range and lower the average by 0.25.
The same thing would happen if C, D, E, or F were to submit a quote higher than the middle band; they
would be excluded from the calculation, but pull a previously excluded outlier into the band.
The outliers themselves cannot manipulate the Libor by submitting a false quote within the same
excluded quartile, but a false quote that moves to the middle band or the other quartile will change the
output value. That is, B cannot manipulate the output by submitting a quote of I instead of 2. B's quotes
are already too low to be included. But if B submits a quote of 4, then she joins the middle band, which
now stands as B, D, E, and F with quotes of 4, 4, 5, and 6, respectively, or 4.75. Similarly, B can alter
the range if B submits a quote that is too high to be included. If B changes from 2 to 9, she pushes G into
the middle range. Thus the middle range becomes D, E, F, and G with quotes of 4, 5, 6, and 7,
respectively. The average value jumps to 5.5. Again, B's manipulation was dampened by the exclusion
system; B's submitted a quote that was 7 higher than her real value, but the Libor average only went up
by 1. Still, she was able to change the value without any assistance.
If the middle range involves more than 50% of the panel banks, then even more banks may
manipulate in either direction. In fact, fewer than 50% of the bank quotes are excluded because banks
with quotes that tie the middle 50% are included. Thus, from Jan. 2, 2007 until Aug. 8, 2007, 95% of
panel quotes were included in the average. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor Manipulation?,36 J.
BANKING & FIN. 136, 145 (2012). During that period, more than 95% of the time, a bank could
influence the Libor total by changing its quote.
172.
Note, however, that there are conditions under which fewer than 75% of the banks can
impact the rate. If all the banks submit a quote of, say, 4, and then bank A falsely submits 5, her
submission will be the sole outlier. It will be excluded and the average will remain 4. In such cases, no
single bank can reliably alter the output value.
173.
It goes without saying that banks with opposite signs on their net positions might try to
manipulate in opposite directions, and thereby cancel one another out. If banks' incentives were always
balanced, this would provide a check on the system. We should be cautious before taking comfort in this
possibility; it is easy to imagine reasons that banks' positions might broadly correlate, or that not all
banks would manifest manipulative intentions, or both.
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makes it harder to detect manipulation, lowering the expected impact of
sanctions for manipulation. By contrast, many product indices, like the S&P
500, draw on public prices and therefore are harder to manipulate.
Second, byproduct indices do not themselves generate a large revenue
stream, so index providers have comparatively less to lose by discrediting the
index. By contrast, product indices generate revenue streams whose
maintenance dilutes their provider's incentive to manipulate.
Third, because byproduct indices are made alongside other product lines,
their creators may experience conflicts of interest. It is easier and more
tempting for Libor banks or their employees to profit from manipulation since
they already deal in loans and swaps. Conversely, a product provider like S&P
could profit from manipulating its indices only if it broadened its business to
begin stock-trading. The opportunities for conflict are plainly greater for
byproducts.
Though probative, these features are neither necessary for manipulation
nor limited to byproduct indices. For example, Platts provides price data
through research and expertise that is hard to observe. It could potentially
manipulate its price quotes without detection, and in the 1930s, Platts was
accused of doing just that in order to facilitate the collusive practices of major
oil companies. The United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. case, a staple of
antitrust casebooks, concerned oil companies conspiring to buy up distressedprice oil from the spot market that might have otherwise depressed the market
price of their product.17 4 The plaintiffs alleged that Platts enabled the cartel by
publishing false price data, allowing the oil companies to buy up the distressed
oil at distressed prices but still inputting higher transaction prices when
computing the market price. Without Platts's cooperation, the purchase of
distressed-priced oil could have lowered the Platts price in a manner identical
to how the oil would be sold on the open market. That would automatically
lower the price paid by contracts indexed to Platts and indirectly lower the
price buyers were willing to pay in the future. With Platts's alleged help, the
manipulators could maintain an artificial price.
Even a public index may be manipulated, though typically for different
reasons. Public indices are produced for policy reasons. Shifts in those policies
could result in shifts in the index's functioning and output, to the benefit of the
index providers' goals and the detriment of those depending on the consistency
and accuracy of the index. For example, we have already described the ways in
which policy objectives drove changes to the construction of CPI,17 5 and other
examples are near at hand.17 6

174.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
175.
See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
176.
See, e.g., The Political Economy of the Consumer Price Index, BRIAN EASTON (July 15,
2010), http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/?p=1517 (discussing the political economy of New Zealand's CPI).
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A substantial political science literature is devoted to studying the
behavior of publicly minded entities, detailing particular risks inherent in
public uses of money and power.'77 Public indices can become political
playthings, subject to alteration for partisan political gain, and unlike product
indices, the profit motive does not stand to dilute any manipulative impulse
with the prospect of lost future revenue.1 78
2. Underproduction
A product is underproduced if the social value of its production exceeds
its social cost, but it is nevertheless not produced.' 79 Both index
underproduction and malproduction typically result from a particular kind of
collective action problem. A classic collective action problem occurs where a) a
specific objective is in the interests of all individuals in a group, but b) the
benefits of the objective cannot be individually internalized, leading to c) each
individual attempting to free ride upon others' pursuit of the objective, with the
result that d) the objective goes unrealized.so
Collective action problems of this sort are to be expected in the context of
the production of public or collective goods.' 8 Public goods are those in which
an individual consumer's enjoyment of the good is not diminished as the
consumer base expands, and from which it is difficult to exclude any

177.
See, e.g., Mark Sidel, The Promise and Limits of Collective Action for Nonprofit SelfRegulation: Evidence from Asia (University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-06, 2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract-l 090616.
178.
See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: The
Private Uses of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 9-11 (1998) (noting
some of the features of governance, also applicable to other paradigmatic public producers, which make
the political risks of government failure especially likely; these include the inability of the government
to make credible commitments).
179.
See STEVEN C. HACKETT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES ECONOMICS:
THEORY, POLICY, AND THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 45 (2d ed. 2001) ("Because those who benefit from

positive externalities do not pay for them, their willingness-to-pay is not included in market demand,
and accordingly, market demand is too small."); id. at 47 ("If the benefits flowing to free riders were
included in the market, such as through compulsory taxes or user fees, market demand would shift out
and a larger equilibrium quantity would result."); WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY:

BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 217 (1989) (defining Pareto optimality as "an allocation in which
no one person can be made better off without someone being made worse off").
180.
The literature on collective action problems is vast. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND
THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF

COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409
(1974); Barry R. Weingast, The PoliticalFoundations ofDemocracy and the Rule ofLaw, 91 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 245 (1997).
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William H. Oakland, Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and Underproduction, 82 J.
POL. ECON. 927, 927 (1974) ("The consensus . . . is that private markets will systematically
underprovide for collective goods."); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 725 (2006) ("[AII
members of society share the good without depleting it and none can be excluded from doing so.
Tragically, therefore, no class member has any incentive to bring the case. This is the collective action
dilemma which results in the underproduction of the positive externality.").
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consumer.182 Users of public goods are inclined to 'free ride' without paying
for the good, which can make it difficult for the good's provider to recoup the
cost of providing it.
Indices resemble public goods, because everyone can enjoy them without
diminishing the benefits to others, and because they are nearly non-excludable,
with index providers facing difficulties in preventing consumption of their
goods and services. Everyone can benefit from a dependable public index for
blueprinting, contracting, and information, but no one would like to pay for it
unless they must, and it is difficult to fully exclude anyone from the use of an
index. Any one of us can compare our portfolio's results to the S&P 500 or
purchase the 500 stocks it contains, just as we can contract to pay our bank
Libor +2% on our mortgage. Because an index is information, its dissemination
cannot be as easily controlled as other products, and it would be practically
impossible for S&P or the BBA to prevent these small, private transactions.
Where a provider of a good is unable to exclude users, and hence charge for
their use, its incentive to produce is correspondingly lower.
Each of the three index types exists against the backdrop of this collective
action problem, and therefore each may be underproduced. This risk is
naturally pronounced with product indices because of the difficulty providers
face in excluding users. To activate a product market, a provider must be able
to protect his index, which in turn requires some degree of enforceable
intellectual property rights. With the legal right to exclude users, a product
index provider can charge users in order to recoup its costs and sue to prevent
infringement, internalizing at least some of the benefits of the index. As long as
it is profitable for the provider to generate the index, users can count on getting
it.

Of course, these rights can also create their own incentives to
underproduce. Indices, once made, are essentially costless to share. Optimally,
a provider would charge each user its tiny average cost so that few users would
actually be excluded. Yet providers will sometimes find it possible to set prices
This restricted output leaves some consumers
higher, excluding some.'
unsatisfied, representing inefficient "dead-weight" loss to society. This
inefficiency is typical of monopolist pricing,184 and it follows from the fact that
intellectual property rights give a producer a limited monopoly on the index.
Anyone who wants to use the S&P 500 must get permission from S&P. Some
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Economists typically define market power as the ability to maintain prices above a
competitive level. See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven C. Salop, Monopoly
Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 247 (1987). The Supreme Court has
defined market power as "the ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive
market." NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984); see also William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 977 (1981).
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estimates put the cost of monopolistic behavior by product indices well into the
billions of dollars per year.'ss A thriving product market solves the collective
action problem but introduces monopoly output restrictions; the balance of
these two effects will determine the net effect on underproduction.
Public indices represent a classic form of response to a collective action
problem. Certain important public goods are often best produced through
government provision by public funds, such as military defense, or natural
monopolies, like water utilities. Similarly, some indices can be produced even
when the index itself generates no revenue. Revenue-indifferent public index
providers do some work in filling gaps in the market, providing an index even
where it would be hard to cover its costs through user-revenues. The BLS, for
example, spends more than half a billion dollars annually in providing public
indices such as the PPI and CPI without attempting to charge for them.186
However, there is no reason to think that the government will fully solve the
underproduction problem. If provision of the index is not a priority-if, for
instance, Congress has cut the department's budget or considers the subject
matter politically unattractive-then the mere existence of user utility will not
compel the production of the index and underproduction will persist. By
contrast, a product provider is more likely to produce an index whenever users
would find it valuable.
Moreover, even when public indices are provided, they may simply be
unable to perform certain roles. It is hard to imagine BLS creating a Libor
substitute, for instance, since many market participants flocked to Libor
precisely to avoid government-controlled indices.' 87
The third type of index, byproduct indices, can often escape the collective
action problem without resorting to public provision or intellectual property. If
an index must be produced in order to pursue other profitable business, then its
provider need not find some way to charge for the index itself. However, like a
public index provider, a byproduct index provider is unlikely to increase or
maintain index production just because users find it valuable. The byproduct
index can disappear or remain static, even as demand grows, if the primary
product is not sufficiently profitable.
For example, banks publish their prime rate, the rate at which they lend to
their best customers, in the course of their business, which allows others to
Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., LLC, No. 06-CH-24798, at 14 (111.
185.
Cir. Ct. July 8, 2010), http://www.sec.gov./comments/sr-ise-2012-022/ise201222-2.pdf (noting that
plaintiffs' expert estimated $2 to $9.7 billion in potential savings to investors arising from interexchange price competition on DJIA and S&P 500 alone).
FY 2012 CongressionalBudget Justification,supra note 131, at 2 ($647 million budget).
186.
187.
See, e.g., Michael Carsella, The LIBOR Controversy PartII: FocusingAttention on Basis
Risk andLoan Profitability, SECURED LENDER, May/June 2010, at 44, 45, http://www.thesecuredlenderdigital.com/thesecuredlender/20100506#pg46 ("Libor is a more accurate reflection of the true financing
market because it is based on daily market rates for interbank unsecured loans, whereas the FFTR
[Federal Funds Target Rate] is laden with the more political goals of controlling inflation and
maintaining healthy economic growth (remember, Prime generally mirrors the FFTR plus 3%).").
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construct indices based on this data for free. However, if the bank leaves the
primary business line that generates prime data, the data will disappear.
Casebooks are replete with the problems observed when banks go out of
business, and so stop byproduction of their prime rate.188 The reference rate
term for the note then has no referent, leaving the borrower's obligations
uncertain. Freeriders on byproduct indices risk being left in the lurch.
Moreover, courts seem insufficiently sensitive to the risks faced by
byproduct indices. To take one recent example, the New York Mercantile
Exchange has sought to treat its NYMEX commodity price index as a product
index, charging users for the right to incorporate the index into exchange traded
derivatives and denying access to non-payers, but courts have forbidden this
move. 189 Courts, in addressing the risk that NYMEX might cease to produce
the index if it cannot monetize it, seem to assume that because the index is
produced as an incident of other projects, it is not dependent upon license fee
revenue: "NYMEX needs no such incentives here. In order to establish a
functioning commodities market it must have a price at which to settle open
positions. Furthermore, NYMEX is required by law to record settlement prices
.... ,190 NYMEX's exchange business, its primary product, entails the creation
of the index as a byproduct, and the court is happy to let the law dragoon
NYMEX's publication of the index as well.
But the NYMEX court, and courts relying on similar logic, neglect an
important danger: preventing the monetization of the NYMEX index leaves the
index's existence and quality wholly dependent on the primary product. If the
New York Mercantile Exchange's business shrinks, the NYMEX indices may
disappear. Even if the indices do not disappear, they may not be improved to
the level that they might if doing so brought extra revenue. Cases like NYMEX
dilute incentives to maintain or increase the quality of the byproduct.
3. Malproduction
Malproduction refers to the inefficient or suboptimal management of an
index. For example, index providers can fail to take account of the effect of
their changes on their users, neglect their responsibilities for updating the
index, or hire cheap but untalented staff. Each type of index is susceptible to

188.
See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1990)
(upholding application of a a substitute prime rate and rejecting the argument "that the applicable
postmaturity rate should be one percent because the contract specifies a prematurity rate equal to FNBMidland Prime plus one percent, and upon FNB-Midland's insolvency, FNB-Midland Prime evaporated,
leaving one percent").
188.
See, e.g., Blanton, 918 F.2d at 532 (applying a substitute prime rate); Montgomery First
Corp. v. Caprock Inv. Corp., 89 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App. 2002) (denying summary judgment to a
note holder who failed to establish the amount due on a note, where note had been paid in reference to
the base rate of a defunct bank).
189.
N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007).
190.
Id. at 118.
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malproduction, but the risk of malproduction faced by byproduct indices is the
subtlest and most important.
Least likely to malproduce are product indices, which are encouraged by
market pressure to maintain index quality for their users.19 1 Though market
power may sometimes permit them some slack in their operations,192 their only
affirmative incentive for malproduction involves cost savings.
Lacking the disciplining effects of the market, a public index provider
may be more likely to neglect its operations. Public index malproduction seems
to be at the heart of the infamous ALCOA case, in which a supply contract for
alumina smelting failed to keep pace with the seller's cost of production.19 3
Although scholars such as Goldberg have criticized the design of the
contract, 194 much of the parties' problem came from the malproduction of a
neglected public index. The contract tied ALCOA's costs to WPI-IC, an
ancestor of the producer price index. The WPI-IC index may have been a fine
choice for a price index in 1967, having been greatly expanded and reclassified
only months prior,195 but it would proceed to go almost ten years without any
substantial update, becoming progressively less relevant. By 1975, the director
of the Council on Wage and Price Stability criticized the index for presenting
"totally inadequate data." 96 In particular, BLS did not update the index to
reflect the massive effect of the 1973 oil embargo on production costs. 9 7
It is not that public indices are themselves disposed to malproduction;
instead, lack of a profit motive means that discipline must come from the
provider's own accountability structure. Byproduct and public indices similarly
lack the profit incentive for optimal index production that product indices
possess. Because WPI-IC was a public index produced by the government, its
continued vitality was bureaucratically and politically contingent.
The most interesting cases of malproduction concern byproduct indices,
which will often have an incentive to malproduce. Understanding exactly why,
however, requires a more in-depth analysis of the byproduction index model.
Byproduction is a species of what economists call "joint production," which
involves one firm producing multiple products. Byproduction is the subset of

191.
See infra Part II.D.I.
192.
See supra note 183.
193.
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (ALCOA).
GOLDBERG, supra note 40, at 349 (calling the contract "poorly structured" and "pretty
194.
much doomed from the start").
195.
JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG & WILLIAM T. MOYE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 235 (1985).
196.
Id.
Id. at 236 (noting that the Secretary of Labor acknowledged that BLS failed to provide
197.
adequate wholesale price data regarding petroleum products).
198.
M. Ishaq Nadiri, Joint Production, in 2 The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics
1028 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
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joint production in which one product is created largely as a side effect of the
inputs made available by the dominant product's creation process.199
An example should make the background idea intuitive. A company,
seeing a lucrative opportunity for a leather goods business, may begin raising
cattle. They will, as a result, have a significant amount of beef available and
may begin a subsidiary beef-selling line as a byproduct business. They will do
so even if the benefits of selling beef do not match the cost of an independent
cattle-raising business for selling beef. They may even give away the beef for
free. Consumers, as a result, may often get cheaper beef from the
byproducer.200 But they should not expect the beef to meet the highest
standards of quality. The best leather cows may not make the best beef.
Like beef produced jointly with leather, byproduct indices may often be
offered at lower cost to users than product indices would be, but may be
managed in whatever way best serves the primary product, which in turn may
not be the best for the index user. Libor is produced with information generated
through banks' ordinary lending business, and it is used to support their
derivatives business. Many users write contracts to Libor without paying for it,
like consumers enjoying leftover beef.
For another example, consider the ways that an index affiliated with an
exchange might be exploited to benefit the latter. FTSE has recently included
questionable Russian firms on its indices even though they differ from the bluechip English firms that make up most of its roster.201 This perplexing behavior
can be explained as malproduction. Many funds use FTSE indices as blueprints
for exposure to high-quality UK companies. If questionable firms are placed on
a FTSE index, they may be purchased by investors who rely on the index.
FTSE is owned by the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which generates
substantial profits from listing fees. If LSE makes clear to firms that listing on
the LSE ensures a place on a FTSE index, risky issuers might tender steep
listing fees as the price of reaching investors that would previously have
avoided them.202 This might displease FTSE-linked funds and risk FTSE's
199.
See generally John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON.
REv. 268, 268 (1981) (discussing aspects of joint production and shared inputs) [hereinafter Panzar &
Willig, Economies of Scope]; John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scale in Multi-Output
Production,91 Q. J. ECON. 481, 484 (1977) (discussing joint production).
Panzar & Willig, Economies of Scope, supra note 199, at 268 (providing a theoretical
200.
overview of economies of scope); David J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise,
1 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 223 (1980).
FTSE 100 Reshuffle as Russian Mining Companies Move In, MINDFUL MONEY (Dec. 6,
201.
2011), http://www.mindfulmoney.co.uk/8984/investing-strategy/ftse- 100-reshuffle-as-russian-miningcompanies-move-in.htn [hereinafter Reshuffle]. See generally Courtney Weaver, Russian Groups Gain
a Toehold in FTSE 100, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2011, 9:08 PM), http://www.ft.com/intVcms/s/0/99c2280620f4-1 Iel-8a43-00l44feabdc0.html (describing governance concerns for Russian firms).
202.
See Megan Davies & Melissa Akin, Fearof Kremlin Whim Stalks Russian FTSE Hopes,
REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2011, 9:32 AM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/10/28/uk-russia-ftse-listingsidUKLNE79ROOY20111028; Ilya Khrennikov, Evraz, Polymetal Join FTSE 100 to Escape Russia
Country Risk, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2011, 3:53 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-07/
evraz-polymetal-join-ftse-100-to-escape-russia-country-risk-1-.html.
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long-term credibility, 203 but these could be acceptable results for LSE if it
sufficiently benefits its listing enterprise. On our terms, LSE would be treating
the FTSE as a byproduct in service of its exchange business, which leads to
malproduction. As a wave of mergers unite index business with other firms,
even product indices will face byproduct-like incentives to malproduce.204
III. Fixing Indices
This Section presents various solutions to manage the risks associated
with indexing. Our taxonomic analysis from earlier bears fruit in this section
primarily by illuminating the relationship between the motivations for an
index's production and the risks attendant to it, which clarifies how a solution
can be carefully tailored to the specific risks a particular index generates.
We consider a full range of responses to indexing risks. In Part A, we
evaluate three types of solutions that have attracted attention. We show that
market forces and the threat of enforcement can serve a role in reducing
malproduction and manipulation, particularly for product indices. However,
these tools are of limited utility for addressing underproduction, since you
cannot punish an index into existence. Likewise, such discipline may be less
useful to improve public and byproduct indices because they are less
responsive to profit-based or coercive pressures. We next show how good
governance and best practices in index production can help to reduce the risk of
malproduction and manipulation, especially for public indices, but that it can be
difficult to dictate good governance terms. It is often easier for product
providers to design good governance themselves when incentives are aligned.
We are therefore cautious about the government prescribing one-size-fits-all
rules for index methodologies.
Given this reality, we argue in Part B that the best way to reduce the risks
associated with index provision may be to bolster providers' intellectual
property rights in their indices. Strengthened intellectual property would
provide incentives for product providers to better tend to their indices, and
encourage byproduct indices to transition to product status in order to take
advantage of increased opportunities for benefit internalization. This would
increase index competition, sharpening incentives against underproduction and
malproduction while diluting incentives to manipulate.
The current intellectual property regime governing indices fails to provide
these incentives. It is weak and incoherent. A better regime would encourage

203.
204.

Reshuffle, supra note 201.
See, e.g., Ann Saphir, CBOE: Only 'Positives' From CME's S&P Index Deal, REUTERS

(Oct.
5,
2011,
11:08
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/cboe-indexesidUSWEN911220111005 (describing CME Group, an options exchange, taking a stake in S&P indices);
Ben Harrington, Pearson Sells £450m Stake in FTSE to London Stock Exchange, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 12,

2011, 8:43 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/8950265/Pearson-sells-450m-stake-inFTSE-to-London-Stock-Exchange.htmil.
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byproduct producers to operate more like product indices. The combination of
intellectual property with market pressure, enforcement, and good governance
may hold promise for addressing the most difficult byproduct problems, such as
a Libor manipulation. This argument has been not only been overlooked but in
some cases actively blocked by the current intellectual property regime, to the
detriment of providers and consumers alike.
A. EvaluatingSolutions
1. Market Solutions
Two features of markets can potentially manage index risk. First, market
competition will discipline product index providers to maintain quality on pain
of losing their users to another provider. To retain users, a provider must limit
malproduction and manipulation. However, the strength of competitive forces
will depend on the index provider's stance toward losing its users, and the cost
of users transitioning to a new index.
Unfortunately, the cost for users to transition to a new index may be high.
Indices enjoy substantial network effects, and so, just as with trading venues,
we should expect the dominance of one index in a given niche. 205 An index
may become so dominant that one would give up substantial benefits by opting
for a competitor.206 Some users may prefer a malproduced or manipulated
index to one that is less liquid or well-known. 20 7
Risks may be greater for less liquid users. The network effects of indices
are particularly apparent in long-term relationships. 20 8 Many swaps, corporate
bonds, and mortgages are written for terms of decades. Therefore, leaving a bad
index could create significant transaction costs as parties renegotiate their
contracts to select a new index.
Despite these challenges, competition still sets a boundary on the extent of
malproduction. Whatever costs users face in leaving an index can be overcome
if a competitor subsidizes escape.209 Costs are likely to be high to tip Libor,
given the need to renegotiate six million home mortgages. However, another
205. Craig Pirrong, Bund for Glory, or, It's a Long Way to Tip a Market at 3 (Feb. 23, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-672504 ("Theory predicts that financial markets are
'tippy,' that is, that all trading volume tends to gravitate to a single trading venue.").
206.
Cf Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REv. 813 (1998);
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L.

REV. 479, 562-86 (1998).
207. Telephone interview with John Grout, Policy and Technical Director, Association of
Corporate Treasurers (Nov. 8, 2011) (stating that companies don't care about "the nth decimal point" of
cost as long as they have a rate they understand).
208. Id.
209. See Pirrong,supra note 205 (German government bonds tipped from LIFFE to Eurex for
about 3%of total costs); see also LIEBOWITZ & MAROOLIS, supranote 74, at 138 ("Tipping occurs when
a product subject to increasing returns generates sufficient momentum in market share that its
domination of the market becomes inevitable.").
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provider would have an incentive to enter if the benefits of tipping Libor were
greater than these attendant costs.210 Where indices operate as products, it does
not appear that lock-in effects have been problematically strong. Vigorous
competition between Dow Jones, S&P and others for index clients does not
seem to have been inhibited by S&P's larger position.
On the other hand, Libor, a byproduct index, does not directly generate
significant fees from users. This means that Libor and other byproduct indices
are less likely to be disciplined by competition than product indices. More
generally, product index providers rely on users for revenue, but byproduct and
public providers do not directly rely on fees from the index. Therefore, the
disciplining effect of market competition is both blunted for the latter types of
indices and more acute for product indices.
Whatever the incentive effects of the market on the provider, a second
market solution exists insofar as users can craft contractual terms to protect
themselves from problematic indices. Sophisticated lenders have long included
so-called "market disruption" clauses to protect themselves from disruptions to
the Libor rate.211 A contract might authorize the substitution of a new referent if
an index becomes untenable. However, these clauses are typically hard to
invoke212 and often require the agreement of a large majority of a banking
syndicate. 2 13 Even then, it may be necessary to prove that a market disruption
has taken place.214 Use of these clauses has accordingly been rare. Prior to the
LIBOR disruption, perhaps a half dozen of these clauses had ever been
invoked.215 Even the events implicated in In re Libor resulted in the invocation
of very few of these clauses. 216
Contractors could negotiate more easily invoked disruption clauses for
Libor or any other index, but counterparties will worry that the index is only a

210.
Yet even the fee to tip Libor may not be prohibitively high. Mortgage brokers hawk
refinancings every few years. If suitably encouraged, they could bring new indices as well as new prices.
211.
Financial Crisis Series: Impact on Loans and Credit Markets, PRACTICAL LAW
COMPANY (Feb 13, 2009), http://us.practicallaw.com/1-384-0310.
212.
Wood, supra note 152, at 28 (noting that MDCs "were more habit-forming than useful").
213.
Gray, supra note 153, at 3; Philip Rawlings, Market Disruption Clauses in Syndicated
Loans, 24 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT. BANK & FIN. L. 447,449 (2009).
214.
See, e.g., Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de
Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 O.J. C 180, 12 (invoking clause); Market Disruption Clauses,
BAKER & MCKENZIE 2 (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Publication/42a752c42c81-42ab-828d-50c9f9118cb3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/350636f4-4028-4e62-a0895285c7cOcf78/al-marketdisruptionclausesoct08.pdf (discussing difficulties with invoking clause).
215.
Gray, supranote 153, at 4.
216.
Loan
Agreement:
Borrowing Mechanics, PRACTICAL
LAW
COMPANY,
http://us.practicallaw.com/3-383-6717 ("However, Lenders rarely invoke this right because .... They
may not want to jeopardize their relationship with the borrower."); A. David Reynolds, Disruptions in
the LIBOR Market: Borrowers Beware When the Boilerplate is Broken, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY
(June 8, 2009), http://us.practicallaw.com/4-386-1075. This is perhaps to be expected; the boilerplate
that gave rise to disruption clauses was drafted to address index disappearance, not manipulation. Wood,
supra note 152, at 18 ("The London Interbank Eurodollar market was only a few years old, and
therefore banks considered that it might be vulnerable to disappearance.").
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temporary measure in the contract and that the real price term is the substitute
217
term. Worse yet, contracting to set the substitution conditions, or litigating
their use, creates transaction costs of the sort that indices were selected to
avoid.218
Another limitation to contracting for disruption clauses is the difficulty of
detecting profitable index manipulations. Index manipulation will often be hard
to detect and still harder to prove. The scale of use of any of the major indices
is measured in the trillions of dollars. Even a small adjustment in value could
result in millions of dollars of gains over a short period of time. Although the
absolute wealth transfer will be large, the index number itself may only deviate
slightly, and may appear to be well within the range of ordinary price
fluctuations. Thus, many contractors will not know when to invoke a
contractual protection, negotiate for them, or shop for another index.
Most importantly, however, the disciplining force of market competition
is currently limited because of underproduction. As a public good, indices will
often not exist in sufficient number for robust competition to have its salutary
effects. Hence, market solutions are unlikely to solve all index problems, but
are proportionately more effective where product indices are able to capture
large revenues.
2. Enforcement
Enforcement, by which we mean private, administrative, and criminal
adjudication, plays a role in preventing and remedying index problems,
particularly for product indices. In re Libor now involves plenty of pending
enforcement. In that class-action lawsuit, interim counsel has been appointed
for two classes of aggrieved investors including the City of Baltimore, pension
funds, hedge funds, and individual investors alleging either that they purchased
or sold Libor-based assets in the over-the-counter market, such as swaps, or on
an exchange such as Eurodollar futures, respectively. 2 19 The facts allege that
the plaintiffs either sold assets at depressed prices, such as Eurodollar futures,
or held assets at decreased revenues, such as an interest rate swap.
The resulting legal claims invoke a vast collection of laws: the Sherman
Act;220 equivalent state law antitrust laws; 221 federal securities laws;222 state

Rawlings, supra note 213, at 449 (reporting that borrowers may be resistant to market
217.
disruption clauses that may override the index term too readily, particularly if invocation of the term is
difficult to dispute); see also IIG Capital LLC v. Van Der Merwe & Anor, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 542
(litigating the certification of amount due under guarantee).
See, e.g., IIG Capital LLC v. Van Der Merwe & Anor, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 542 ; see
218.
also Verstein, supra note 47 (showing that the benefits are reduced when contractual principals must
monitor their specifying agents, including indices).
See sources cited supra note 16. The Charles Schwab Fund family is suing separately.
219.
See Complaint, Schwab Money Market Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3:11 -cv-04186-MEJ (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Schwab MMF Complaint].
Schwab MMF Complaint Jf93-99 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
220.
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securities laws;223 state torts;224 state contract laws;225 state unfair business
practice laws; 2 26 state fraud laws; 227 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO); 22 8 and manipulation in violation of the Commodity
Exchange Act. 22 9 Criminal, antitrust, and securities agencies from half a dozen
countries have subpoenaed and, in some cases, already punished panel
banks.230
Optimal deterrence often involves forcing actors to internalize the social
costs of their behavior. Imposing litigation costs upon product providers will
often encourage best practices. Product providers have a robust revenue stream
associated with their index. As profit seekers, these providers will try to lower
costs, including enforcement-related costs. Threatened with liability for
negligent or intentional mismanagement of an index, many product providers
will be deterred from wrongdoing.
Optimal deterrence through enforcement is unlikely in cases of byproduct
indices like Libor, highlighting the limits of enforcement. It is far more difficult
to use enforcement to discipline a byproduct index provider because any
credible enforcement activity may lead to over-deterrence and exacerbate
underproduction. This is because enforcement imposes on providers the social
costs of their indices, but byproduct indices do not directly capture the social
benefits of their indices. The potential costs of index dysfunction being

221.
Id. 11 203-09.
222.
Id.
117-28 (citing Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012) (civil liability
for false registration statement)); id. f 129-37 (citing Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. §
771(a)(2) (2012) (civil liability for omission or untrue statement of material fact)); id. 138-41 (citing
Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2012) (liability of persons controlling anyone liable under
§ 77k or § 771)); id. 142-51 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2012), and S.E.C. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (prohibiting manipulative and deceptive devices
in connection with purchase or sale of security)); id. IT 152-54 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012) (controlling person liability)).
223.
Id. $f 185-89 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25400-01 (civil liability for false or misleading
statements or omissions in connections with securities sale)).
224.
Amended Class Action Complaint t 143-45, Metzler Inv. GmbH v. Credit Suisse, No.
1I-MD-2262 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Metzler Complaint] (tortious interference with
contractual relation); Schwab MMF Complaint, supra note 220,
100-104 (interference with economic
advantage under California law).
225.
Schwab MMF Complaint $ 190-95 (breach of implied covenant of good faith); id.
196-202 (unjust enrichment); Metzler Complaint, supra note 224, $T 136-42 (breach of contract).
226.
Schwab MMF Complaint, supranote 220,1$ 105-108 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
17200).
227.
Id.
109-16 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1572, 1709, 1710 (fraud, deceit and
concealment)).
228.
Id. 11155-84 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (2012) (prohibiting participation in
racketeering activity)).
229.
Metzler Complaint, supra note 224, 115-21 (alleging defendants caused artificial prices
on CME, a contract market) (citing 7 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (2012)).
230.
Cf Lindsay Whipp, Tokyo watchdog imposes two sanctions on Citi, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16,
2011, 5:37 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/645da6a2-27d6-Ilel-a4c4-00144feabdcO.html (stating
that Japan's Financial Services Agency imposed sanctions on Citi after finding that Citi staff had
attempted to manipulate Libor and Tibor in order to benefit trading positions).
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astronomical,231 even honest firms may face substantial litigation expenses
from meritless lawsuits. 23 2 With no index-related revenue, a byproduct provider
may decide that providing an index costs more than it contributes to whatever
primary activity the index was a byproduct of. Certain Libor panel banks have
already withdrawn in the wake of litigation.233
Moreover, when enforcement does not over-deter, it may under-deter,
because of the practical difficulties of credible punishment. It will generally be
hard to detect and prove manipulation, and establish damages;234 it is especially
hard for byproduct indices like Libor, which utilize non-verifiable, proprietary
data rather than the public data used in product indices like S&P 500. Index
disruptions of the sort noted in In re Libor may have many causes, and
enormous profits can be reaped within the realm of statistically insignificant
error.
After proof, there comes punishment. To cause the perpetrators to make
victims whole would be an appropriate but devastating remedy. The Financial
Times described the potential liability from Libor enforcement as "too
catastrophic to impose." 235 The cost of a penalty could easily bankrupt many
index providers.
This problem is more severe for byproduct indices because, by definition,
the provider has some other line of business that enables the index. Three
quarters of the USD Libor panel contributors are Globally Systemically
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), and almost half of the global SIFIs are
USD Libor panel banks. 23 6 Especially during a financial crisis, it may be
unrealistic to punish such providers at the risk of their collapse. Enforcement
can only deter if its threats are credible, but it may be too costly to fully punish

231.
Libor Penalty,supra note 20 (noting that Libor manipulation damage could have come to
$1 trillion).
232.
More than a dozen firms have been sued in In re Libor. Consolidated Amended
Complaint, In re Libor, No. 1:11-md-02262, 2012 WL 1522306 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012). Ifonlya few
banks were involved in the Libor disruption, then the other firms have incurred substantial defense fees
by association.
233.
Whipp, supra note 230; Stanley Carvalho and David French, Exclusive: Libor Scandal
Forces Barclays From UAE Rate Panel-Sources, REUTERS (July 15, 2012, 8:43 AM),

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/15/us-banking-libor-eibor-idUSBRE86EO3N20120715.
Enforcement could harm product production too, if liability attaches to data providers. Argus, a provider
akin to Platts, argued that new CFTC enforcement rules "may unnecessarily chill the voluntary
submission of transaction related data by market participants to compilers of price indices." Prohibition
on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition
on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,408 (July 14, 2011) (promulgating final rules, and describing
comments received).
234. See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in
ManipulationLaw: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and EmpiricalAnalysis,
15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2012) (describing the use of screens in pleading).
235.
Libor Penalty, supranote 20.
236.
Thirteen out of twenty-eight global SIFIs are panel banks, and thirteen out of eighteen
panel banks are global SIFIs. See Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs),
FIN. STABILITY BOARD (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_121031ac.pdf.
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index providers who provide other important services. By contrast, a monoline
product index might be made to buckle under the weight of liability without
compromising the broader financial system.
When the expected cost of enforcement is high, product providers may
improve their indices to avoid credible threats of punishment. By contrast
punishment may not be credible against byproduct indices, which may be
spared the rod if their primary product is socially important. Even when
punishment is credible, byproduct providers may sometimes find it cheaper to
stop providing the index than to improve it. In either case, the difficulties of
detection and proof limit the power of enforcement. Ideally, enforcement would
be supplemented by other solutions and by structural improvements intended to
make indices more appropriately responsive to enforcement.
3. Governance
Good index governance can reduce the risk of index malproduction and
manipulation, but there is no such thing as a free lunch. Changes to index
practices always create tradeoffs. With even the most attractive solutions
creating costs, it may prove difficult for the government to mandate reforms.
Consider six proposed reforms to BBA Libor as an example for how
regulators might impose best practices for an index. First, it may seem that
banks should submit their Libor quotes anonymously, so as to diminish any
reputational motive for lowballing quotes. While such a change would reduce
the reputational motivation for manipulation, it would increase the attraction of
positional manipulation and rogue trading since it would be harder for the
market to scrutinize bank quotes in terms of comparable data.
Second, some banks seem to have allowed extensive interactions between
the treasurers who set the Libor quote and the traders who bet on Libor. 237 it
may seem that the government should require banks to create a "Chinese wall"
between these groups. Yet this is not obviously better. During the financial
crisis, when bank borrowing was thin, determining banks' borrowing rates was
difficult, and treasurers may have turned to traders as a source of valuable
information on comparable metrics that might bear on the Libor quote.
Such communications would be unnecessary if a third suggestion is
adopted: indices like Libor could be based only on actual market transactions,
rather than each treasurer's subjective sense of what rate they could get. 238 But
some markets are thinly traded, particularly during a financial crisis. Libor is
quoted in 15 maturities in ten currencies. Just what quantity does J.P. Morgan
borrow, unsecured, in London, of Swedish krona, with an 11-month maturity,

Liam Vaughan & Katie Linsell, Libor Flaws Allowed Banks to Rig Rates Without
237.
Conspiracy, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 16, 2012, 5:46 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-16/liborflaws-allowed-banks-to-rig-rates-without-conspiracy.html.
238.
See Eavis & Popper, supra note 119 (quoting Chairman Gary Gensler).
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on any given day at 11 a.m.? There may not be an actual market transaction to
substantiate the bank's daily quote, but a quote is still required. This is because
users-swap participants in particular-want to know the Libor for their
transactions. A rate limited to real transactions would be erratic or blank with
some frequency.
Fourth, the government might go even further, banning those indices for
which reliable market data is not always available. The UK is expected to force
Libor to discontinue peculiar offerings like the 11-month Swedish krona rate.239
Yet this substitutes malproduction for underproduction, and it is doubtful that
the government is better positioned than market participants to decide which
individual rates are better unproduced than produced alongside efforts to
manage their risks.
Fifth, it may seem that Libor panel banks should be barred from also
being Libor users.240 While it is true that separating use and production may
resolve conflicts of interest, this suggestion nevertheless misunderstands the
economics of Libor. For byproduct indices, indirect revenue is the only revenue
the index brings. Divestiture without some substitute revenue stream can only
lead to underproduction. The banks created Libor almost thirty years ago so
that they could use it. If they cannot use it, they may not incur the expense of
maintaining it. 241
Sixth, and finally, submissions could be designed so that manipulation is
more difficult or costly. For example, banks might be required to provide
whatever data justifies their quote, or they might be required to accept trades or
loans at whatever rate they quote. Then banks would be cautious at least to
submit higher quotes, lest they be forced to borrow at a higher price. Both of
these suggestions would make manipulation more costly, but could exacerbate
underproduction since banks may not wish to release proprietary data or make a
market for cash they do not want at that time.
The point is not that these practices are inadvisable, only that it is difficult
for a third party to determine whether a practice is justified for a given index
and how each tradeoff should ideally be made. A government regulator
imposing rules is arguably less likely to make the right decisions here than a
properly motivated provider of a product index. Product index providers will
generally have an incentive to operate in a manner that preserves the value of

239.
Gonzalo Vina, U.K. Will Implement Wheatley Plan for Libor Overhaul in Full,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-17/u-k-willimplement-wheatley-plan-for-libor-overhaul-in-full-l-.html.
240.
See Liam Vaughan, Gavin Finch & Jesse Westbrook, Life as Libor Traders Knew It Seen
as Abusive by Investigators, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-03-02/life-as-libor-traders-knew-it-seen-as-abusive-by-collusion-investigators.html.
Relatedly, it
seems likely that index providers ought to have conflicts policies for their employees to prevent rogue
trading, at a minimum, but the precise level and type of policies are hard to dictate in the abstract.
241.
Peter Thai Larsen & Wayne Arnold, What If Banks Boycott Libor?, REUTERS (July 17,
2012, 4:41 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/07/17/idINL4E81HIHU20120717.
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their product, so they may be expected to take governance seriously.242 Even if
the mandated governance does not make things worse, any business practice
requirement limits the freedom of the provider to exercise its judgment and
discretion, which are the essence of an index's operation and the value it adds.
Sometimes the government cannot avoid mandating governance-that is,
when the government itself is the provider of a public index. Many users are
afraid of government manipulation for political ends; the flight to Libor is
partly attributable to banks' distrust of government controlled indices.24 3 In this
case, insulated and professionalized indices may be better able to resist political
influence and so enjoy greater legitimacy and utility.244
In creating new public indices, the government may wish to co-opt other
market actors in order to overcome informational deficits. Yet in order to do so
the government would require adequate systems of oversight to make sure that
it is not an unwitting abettor of manipulation. For example, the government
could create a benchmark interest rate index based on Fedwire data to compete
with Libor.245 In an important study, authors at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York compared Libor rates to the $2.6 trillion in daily transactions
conducted through Fedwire, which is the Federal Reserve's interbank payment
system.246 This same method could be used to construct an interbank lending
index that would be resilient to political risks from the provider and also based
on actual transactions. This is a promising avenue, though it has its own
challenges. First, an actual-transaction index may disappoint users when there
is no actual transaction upon which to report. Second, this strategy makes banks
involuntary byproducers of the new index with no financial interest in its
accuracy, and they may act strategically, such as engaging in transactions
designed to manipulate the index.247 Any new public indices must be carefully
protected from these perverse incentives.
If the government is able to overcome governance risks, new public
indices could be funded to help solve underproduction and to provide users
with an alternative to existing product and byproduct indices. Public indices
could provide competition to malproducing indices and help overcome
underproduction. Still, it is implausible to rely totally on public provision for
society's index needs. Good governance in index production can probably
reduce index risks, but it is difficult to design efficient rules from the outside.
242.
S&P, for example, mandates that their index committee members have no trading or sales
role within the firm or on their own account. Blitzer interview, supra note 115.
243.
Carsella, supra note 187, at 46.
244.
See STAPLEFORD, supra note 50, at 390-99. It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully
elaborate how agencies can be designed to resist pressures, but a vast literature in political science,
public choice, and economics confronts these questions.
245.
Kuo, Skeie & Vickery, supra note 4.
246.
Id. at 5; see also Fedwire Funds Service-Annual, FED. RES. BOARD,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedfundsann.htm (last updated Aug. 10, 2012)
(providing Fedwire data).
247.
See supra Subsections II.C.2 & 3.
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Providers of product indices have a greater interest in finding credible
methodologies and so may be able to design their own good governance more
readily than may byproduct providers.
B. The Law ofIntellectualProperty and Unjust Enrichment
Market, enforcement, and governance responses are solutions to some
index risks, but their effectiveness is limited when most of the indices come
from byproduct and public providers. In this Section, however, we argue that
the most promising response to the risk of index manipulation is also the best
way to manage the risks of index underproduction and malproduction. This
solution involves reforming the intellectual property law that governs financial
indices, so as to optimize market participants' incentives for index production.
Although all three index types serve important functions, byproduct
indices are prone to special risks, such as conflicts of interest. Product indices
are not without their own risks, but their profit motive often makes them more
responsive to their customers' needs and the law's sanctions. Yet, in recent
years, courts have increasingly forced product indices to migrate to a
byproduction model. Part 1 of this section describes that forced transition by
analyzing recent developments in the law governing indices.
Part 2 urges reform. Financial indices should regain a degree of property
protection similar to that which they enjoyed a decade ago and which served
well since the early 1980s. Moreover, those substantive rights should be
supported on a new doctrinal basis. Rather than returning to the state law
doctrines that previously played the role, we should consider tailoring a federal
regime for financial indices. Such a regime would do more than allow existing
product indices to continue their business; it would permit many byproduct
indices to become product indices if they deemed it more efficient. And even
those that retained their byproduct model would enjoy stronger incentives to
manage their operations responsibly.
1. State Law Misappropriation
For decades, product index providers were able to rely on state common
law to protect their indices. Today, though, courts are increasingly finding that
the Federal Copyright Act preempts state law index protections, but provides
none of its own. This section shows that state-law index property protections
are doctrinally insecure and theoretically confused because they rest on a
flawed analogy between index providers and newsgatherers. Worse yet, the rise
of an equally flawed analogy-indices as securities-is rapidly eroding the few
property protections indices currently possess.
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i. Indices as "Hot News"
Index providers generally possess the right to control use of their index
and its output value. Both property rights find support in the landmark case
Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc. (Comex 1).248 There,

Commodity Exchange, Inc. (Comex) developed a futures contract called the
"Comex 500 Stock Index" that "essentially duplicate[d] the S&P 500.",249
Comex allowed users to trade futures contracts on the Comex 500, despite
S&P's refusal to grant it a license and without paying S&P any fees. The court
of appeals held that Comex had misappropriated S&P's property. 250 Similarly,
in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
(CBOT), 251 the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that index providers may prevent

users from creating contracts settled based on an index, even if users are
licensees of the index data.
These cases are the foundation of contemporary index producers' property
rights, and the basis of Dow Jones, S&P and MSCI's indexing business. Yet
from the beginning, index rights were problematic due to their characterization
as quasi-intellectual property akin to news. Both the Comex I and CBOT courts
grounded their decisions in the "hot news doctrine", which originates in
InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press (INS), a 90-year-old Supreme

Court decision finding that International News Service, by speedily publishing
stories based on fresh news gathered by other news companies rather than
sending their own reporters out for a scoop, had committed tortious
misappropriation.252 INS upheld a quasi-intellectual property right in certain
information because of the effort that went into its acquisition, and because of
the unfairness of taking information acquired by others and selling it at a lower
cost. 253
There is a certain intuitive appeal to thinking of indices as news. Index
outputs are information, like news, which can produce benefits from wide
dissemination. Index providers have a journalistic character both in the manner
that they acquire information and in their historical ties to news agencies. 254

Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y.
248.
1982) (Comex 1), affd, 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982) (Comex Il).
Comex I, 538 F. Supp. at 1069.
249.
Comex II, 683 F.2d at 711.
250.
456 N.E.2d 84 (111. 1983).
251.
252.
248 U.S. 215 (1918). See also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McGraw
Hill Cos., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that Platts has a First Amendment "reporter's
privilege" to its proprietary data and vetting techniques).
253.
Id. at 245 (explaining that the injunction "restrains any taking or gainfully using of the
complainant's news, either bodily or in substance, from bulletins issued by the complainant or any of its
members, or from editions of their newspapers, 'until its commercial value as news to the complainant
and all of its members has passed away."').
For example, Dow Jones retains the Editor-in-Chief of the Wall Street Journal on the
254.
board of its index committee; FTSE's first two letters stand for Financial Times, its founder and
erstwhile 50 percent owner.

52

Index Theory
Still, INS is a poor foundation for the property rights of indices. First, the
case is no longer binding federal law, as it was based on federal common-law
reasoning abandoned in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 25 5 Second, while INS
remains influential under state law, recent Second Circuit decisions have
dangerously narrowed its applicability, ruling that it is preempted by federal
copyright law except in a narrow range of circumstances. 256 The most
important

recent

case

to

address

INS is Barclays Capital Inc, v.

Theflyonthewall.com (Fly), in which the Second Circuit near-fatally narrowed
the doctrinal basis for index rights as well as exposing the ill-conceived basis
upon which index property protection had long rested.257
The defendant in Fly ("Fly") obtained research reports that financial firms
like Barclays sent to customers, and then rapidly summarized the investment
recommendations for Fly's own customers. Fly could provide the essence of
the report and recommendations for a price that did not reflect the bank's
production costs. The buy and sell recommendations of major investment banks
tend to move markets, and the initial possessors of those reports can benefit if
they can act on a recommendation before it becomes widely known. By
publicizing the report to a broader base before the market opens, Fly deprived
the banks' clients of that benefit. Among other things, this reduced the
incentive for customers to maintain relationships with Barclays and pay
commissions on trades. Put simply, Fly's business model was to free-ride on
large banks' research.
Yet, the Second Circuit found no free-riding and ruled for Fly. Widely
acknowledged as marking the death of INS, 258 Fly explicitly relegated the "hot
news" multifactor test of NationalBasketball Association v. Motorola, Inc.,259
INS's progeny, to the realm of dicta.260 The court declared that "Fly is not,
under NBA's analysis, 'free-riding,"' 26 1 primarily because "[i]t is collecting,
collating and disseminating factual information - the facts that Firms and

255.
Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876, 894 (2d Cir. 2011)
(Fly) (noting that INS represented federal common law, which was largely abandoned in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
256.
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, "Hot News ": The Enduring Myth ofProperty in News, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011). While generally critical of INS, Balganesh's sophisticated analysis of the
hot-news doctrine appreciates that the doctrine is an attempt to solve a collective action problem.
257.
650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
258.
See, e.g. Derek Bambauer, Flyonthewall Not Squashed, INFO/LAW (June 21, 2011),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2011/06/21/flyonthewall-not-squashed ("The case smartly inters
INS v. AP, the turgid Supreme Court case that generated the "hot news" misappropriation tort.");
Camille Calman and Robert D. Balin, The Future of the Hot News MisappropriationTort After Barclays
Capital Inc. v.
TheFlyontheWall.com, MEDIA
LAW
MONITOR
(Sept.
16, 2011),
http://www.medialawmonitor.com/2011/09/the-future-of-the-hot-news-misappropriation-tort-afterbarclays-capital-inc-v-theflyonthewall-com ("There seems little doubt that the hot news doctrine has
suffered a serious blow in the Second Circuit.").
259.
105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (NBA).
260. Fly, 650 F.3d at 899-900 (citing NBA, 105 F.3d at 852).
261.
Id. at 902.
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others in the securities business have made recommendations . . . ." The
court treated the banks' recommendations exclusively as facts, and the
intellectual property rights in facts are not readily awarded: "The Firms are
making the news; Fly ... is breaking it." 2 63 Of course INS had provided quasiintellectual property rights in facts, but the Fly court read INS protections very
narrowly. For example, "hot news" protection requires direct competition, but
the court found that the banks and Fly were not competitors. The plaintiffs
offered brokerage services, whereas Fly reported on recommendations. The
court was unconcerned that Fly marketed brokerage services to its customers
that did compete with the banks, the economic equivalent of direct
competition.264
Fly is clearly a problematic precedent for index rights. It diminishes the
precedential power of INS, upon which index rights currently rest. It applies
INS and its progeny so narrowly that there is little hope of an index provider
taking shelter in it. For example, the direct-competition requirement would
prevent a competitor from creating and licensing a copycat index identical to
the S&P 500 since both companies would then be in the index-licensing
business. But it would not seem to prevent a competitor from using the S&P
500 in derivatives or funds, which it then offered to the public, since product
creation is a different line of business. Yet these unauthorized products would
compete with the index provider's licensees, who might prefer to buy the
copycat product rather than license the real thing. These are the exact facts of
Comex I, and if Fly's direct competition requirement had been applied there,
providers' property rights might never have been recognized.
Perhaps the most dangerous element of Fly is not what it changes from
prior precedents, but what it explicitly maintains: INS protected hard work, not
discretion or judgment. The Fly court did not find INS-type hard work, since
"[i]n pressing a 'hot news' claim against Fly, the Firms seek only to protect
their Recommendations, something they create using their expertise and
experience rather than acquire through efforts akin to reporting." 265 Expertise,
experience, reflection and judgment, the court held, were not "effort" akin to
reporting, and therefore the plaintiffs did not invest the proper kind of work
into producing their reports.
Fly thus illustrates the limits of the newsgathering analogy. The court's
reasoning accurately reflects INS's 90-year obsession with hard work in
investigation rather than expertise in judgment. Every major decision
concerning indices has cited INS and followed it in emphasizing investment of

262.
263.
264.
265.
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labor rather than creativity.'" But effort-based protections for indices become
less plausible as the cost of indexing drops through scalable technology.
Although S&P spends a great deal to be in the index business, the marginal cost
of an additional index has become quite low, and many of its inputs are public
prices requiring little investigative effort.267 Many indices are produced as
byproducts, so it is hard to attribute cost and effort directly to their production.
Most importantly, the value of indices is about judgment and discretion in
precisely the ways that courts from INS to Fly have excluded from hot news
protection. The utility of an index's methodology, output value, and data stems
not from the sweat that went into producing it, but from the well-exercised
judgment of its provider.
ii. Indices as Securities
As the strained analogy to news weakens, taking index protections with it,
another bad analogy has arisen that prevents the protection of index property
claims in the first place. Courts seem to imagine that an index provider is like a
firm that has gone public, and that index values, once licensed, are like ordinary
securities. This baffling view has caused indices to lose key legal battles, and
with them, providers' property rights.
Foremost among these cases is Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. International

Securities Exchange, Inc.268 There, defendant ISE created, listed, and facilitated
the trading of options on shares of an exchange traded fund ("ETF'') that, in
turn, tracked the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The dispute concerned whether
unauthorized index derivatives trading amounted to misappropriation from the
creator of the index. 2 69 The plaintiffs claims would seem to be similar to those
in CBOT and Comex l and therefore likely to prevail.
The court found for ISE and against the plaintiff on the ground that
defendant had created options on an ETF and not on the index itself. The index
provider may have a right to withhold its proprietary formulas from users, but
"[b]y authorizing the creation of ETFs using their proprietary formulas, and the
sale of the ETF shares to the public, the plaintiffs [] relinquished any right to
270
control resale and public trading of those shares."
266.
See Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., Inc., No. 05 Civ.1 129(HB), 2005 WL 2100518
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2005), affd sub nom. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295
(2d Cir. 2006); see also Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., LLC, No. 06-CH-24798,
at 14 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2010) (citing INS's progeny as "the source from which Illinois
misappropriation law arose.").
267.
Telephone interview with Alex Matturri, CEO of S&P Dow Jones Indices (Dec. 19,
2011) (asserting that anyone with a spreadsheet and a data stream can be in the index business).
268.
451 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2006).
269.
Id. at 302 ("Plaintiffs have invested time, money, and intellectual creativity into the
creation and maintenance of their indexes. Each argues that this gives it an intellectual-property right in
the index itself, as well as in an ETF that tracks the index, and in options on shares of such an ETF.").
270.
Id. at 303.
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The court posited that an option is merely a particular, conditional form of
trading securities, and vendors or issuers lack the right to constrain the trading
of securities once released. In so holding, the court followed Golden Nugget,
Inc. v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., where an exchange-listed corporation

sought to block the exchange from trading options on its stock.2 71 The Ninth
Circuit declared that the trading of such options could not be constrained.272
The reasoning of Dow Jones allows anyone to circumvent the property
rights recognized in Comex I and CBOT. Dow Jones permits competitors to
write an option whose value is determined by the value of shares of an S&P
500 index fund. Such an option will have essentially identical payout as
verboten options on the index itself. Since nearly all index providers license
their index for use in some fund or derivative, and since courts see no reason to
afford those securities any special treatment under law, the market has become
free to create the economic equivalent of licensed index products without ever
paying a licensing fee. 2 73 Decisions like Dow Jones cast the future of product
indices into disarray. 274
iii. Consequences of Declining Property Protetion
The stakes are high for index providers who have a business model that
depends upon charging market participants for use of their financial products.
An index provider that is unable to control use of its index in derivatives cannot
charge for such use. Unlike a company that will still issue shares, such an index
has been denuded of significant revenue and may cease production. The
implications of cases like Dow Jones are crucial for the financial viability of
index production: "Since ETF options are among the most actively.traded
derivative contracts in the U.S., it is estimated that this result cost index
licensors tens of millions of dollars in annual revenue." 275
The trend in recent case law has been to diminish index property rights,
dangerously undermining the incentives for product index providers to produce
future indices, manage extant indices well, and prevent index problems.
Already, product index providers are a diminishing pack. Concern for
weakening property rights has led to a wave of mergers in the index

271.
Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1987)
272.
Id. at 591.
273.
See, e.g., Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc. v. Archipelago Holdings, LLC, 336 F. Supp. 2d 294,
303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting Nasdaq's suit to prevent Archipelago from facilitating unauthorized
trades of shares of a Nasdaq-affiliated ETF).
274.
Dow Jones follows Fly's direct competition requirement in raising form over economic
substance. Both disallow one transaction as misappropriation while allowing an economically equivalent
one.
275.
Neal Wolkoff, Changes At The Exchanges, J. INDEXES, Jan./Feb. 2007,
http://www.indexuniverse.com/publications/joumalofindexes/joi-articles/2630.html. Indexing is a global
business, and index property has been even more resoundingly limited in important European
jurisdictions. Commerzbank v. Deutsche B6rse, [2010] E.T.M.R. 31.
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business.276 Exchanges may buy indices because they fear that product index
providers may be unable to dependably provide indices if they cannot charge a
license fee. Buying the provider will ensure an exchange access to the basis of
its exchange-traded options. But such a merger ultimately represents a move
from product to byproduct index. They therefore carry risks of malproduction
and manipulation in the form of conflicts of interest and competition concerns,
which are likelier for byproduct indices.
Some providers may adapt to weakened property rights by refusing to
disclose aspects of their index that others might copy, keeping more and more
products in-house. However, the tradeoff in information is rarely between
intellectual property rights and a commons.277 Rather, firms will resort to
secrecy if publicity dissipates the value of their information, even though
secrecy is often socially wasteful. In the index world, this is partly expressed
through fund managers campaigning to run their own indices.278 Secretive, inhouse indices may reduce market transparency and increase agency problems
for investors.279 The creation of indices within funds also represents a migration
from product to byproduct production as an index is taken in-house to serve
fund purposes.
2. Restoring Property
Reversing the trend of eroding index property rights would slow adverse
changes in the market, as well as provide a path for existing byproduct
providers to adopt a product model. Allowing providers to directly internalize
the benefits they create may help solve the implicit collective action problem of
indices as public goods.
To provide some perspective, the global notional value indexed to Libor
exceeds $350 trillion. The vast majority of users do not pay any licensing fee to
the BBA for the use of BBA Libor as a settlement price. If BBA were able to
charge 3 basis points, or 0.03%, of notional value as an annual fee to its present
derivatives users, the result would be about $100 billion in annual revenue.280
$100 billion is a large sum of money, even in terms of global finance.

276.
Telephone interview with Alex Matturri, Chief Executive Officer of S&P Dow Jones
Indices (Dec. 19, 2011).
Edmund M. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
277.
275-80 (1977).
See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
278.
Competition and exclusivity of license are compatible. ETF fees are structured as a cost
279.
to the fund manager, and so we are less worried in this case about the failures of competition in the fund
industry. See generally Jon Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously, Why Governance and
Fee LitigationDon't Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010) (describing the possibilities and
limits of competition to constrain fees).
S&P 500 licensees' funds pay more than 3 bps for the right to track the S&P in their
280.
funds.
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Able to see the explicit value of the BBA Libor index, BBA and the panel
banks might treat the index like a product.281 They would have adequate
incentives to prevent indexing risks, investing in governance and systems to
prevent employee manipulation. If the disturbances were reputational, the
banks would have to weigh reputational effects against the damage to a
valuable revenue stream. Even in the turmoil of a crisis, such revenue would
not be risked lightly.
Stronger intellectual property amounts to promoting the growth of product
indices and the migration of byproduct indices to a product model. For
example, if Libor were more trustworthy and valuable as an independent entity
from the bank's primary business, they might spin it off to an independent
indexing firm with which they have a contract to share data.
Some amount of malproduction and underproduction can come from a
product index provider's market power. 2 8 2 However, their risks are often better
managed than those of byproduct indices. Product indices are more responsive
to market forces than are byproduct indices. Moreover, the licensing fees would
be sufficiently attractive to encourage competitors, drawing more participants
into the field. Although it is costly to transition loan and swap parties to a new
index, a $100 billion annual revenue stream could be large enough for a
283
competitor to compensate users for the difficulty of overcoming lock-in.
We are aware that our emphasis on property rights bucks the trend in
intellectual property circles, which increasingly criticize propertization.284 A
full treatment of the efficacy or normative defensibility of the U.S. intellectual
property regime is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that
financial index providers have special reasons for property protection that
largely sidesteps that debate. First, infamous holdup opportunities are not
present here. It is unlikely that indices serve as crucial building blocks in any
context except as components of the financial derivatives or funds based upon
them. They are therefore unlikely to stack or inhibit innovation. 285
Second, index providers are more sympathetic recipients of ongoing
property protection because of indices' dependence upon their creators'
continuing efforts. A company's logo, an artist's painting, and an inventor's

Presumably, BBA would share revenues with the panel banks it represents in order to
281.
support and encourage their honest submissions.
Propertization can also fail to account for "spillover" benefits to third parties. See
282.
generally BRETr M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES
(2012) (arguing that infrastructure resources should be managed as commons rather than privately
owned).
See supra Subsection IDI..
283.
284.
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a PoliticalEconomy of
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003) (urging commons production); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van
Ypersele, Rewards Versus IntellectualPropertyRights, 44 J.L. & ECoN 525 (2001) (urging prizes).
285.
See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REv. 1991 (2007) (arguing that the U.S. intellectual property regime facilitates holdup
opportunities).
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invention each remains useful even if their creators abandon them. Because
these extant goods can be expected to persist, intellectual property law may
balance the competing interests of the present distribution of those goods
against future production of new goods. 28 By contrast, the value of a financial
index requires continuing effort from its creator to update the methodology and
apply it. If Standard & Poor's exits the index business, the public does not
simply lose out on future index innovation; existing indices will instantly
disappear. The benefits of intellectual property for dynamic efficiency are
usually opposed to reductions in static efficiency; by contrast, static efficiency
often urges index prioritization too.
Third, we have already seen much of the result of this proposal, and it was
unobjectionable. Though this proposal does urge a change of, and increase in,
property rights in this space, it mostly urges a project of retrieval and doctrinal
clarification. The index market functioned satisfactorily for decades. Recent
legal changes have resulted in undesirable market trends, and so we urge
undoing those changes. This is unlike other areas of intellectual property where
increased propertization constitutes a novel change, and one associated with
known problems.
Our present purpose is to urge greater propertization, not to define the
contours of the optimal intellectual property regime for financial indices.m It
must suffice to note some of the features of a proposed regime. First, index
property rights must be secured with federal, not state, law. This is in part
because of the mismatch in protections offered under state law, the focus on the
"sweat of the brow," which fails to appreciate and protect the creativity of the
indexing process.288 Further, if the erosion of state misappropriation doctrine
were reversed, the resulting regime might protect far more than just financial
indices, a result that this proposal cannot be taken to justify. Finally, interstate
diversity in index property is inappropriate given the national character of
indices and index use.
Within the federal regime, there is no perfect fit under existing options.
Therefore, a sui generis treatment, akin to that of mask works289 and boat
hulls,290 may be appropriate.291 This is in part because indices have at least
286.
Scholars have long described this tradeoff as between "dynamic" and "static" efficiency.
Compare Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14
(1969), with Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623 (Nat'l

Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962). See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Cost ofPrice. Why and How
to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REv. 970, 981-93 (2012) (describing the
debate).
287.
In ongoing research, we are exploring the relationships among financial information,
financial indices, and intellectual property.
288.
See supraSubsection III.B.1.i.
289.
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 301, 98 Stat. 3347
(1984) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14).
290.
Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. 105-304, §§ 501-02, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32)
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three protectable components. Federal trademark law protects the name of the
index, but there is also an output value and an input methodology to protect.
Federal copyright law attaches to creativity, and could have been applied to
financial indices had courts not been influenced by the myth of objectivity. But
even copyright law could protect only the output of the index, not its inputs.
The methodology for producing the index, which producers license to
investment funds, would require non-copyright treatment.292 One option would
be a business methods patent, although cases like Bilsky have curtailed the
scope of patent protection for business methods. 293 In any case, the limited
duration of either copyright or patent implies that at some point the protection
of the index will expire and copying will be permitted-but it is not obvious
that index providers should ever surrender their property interest in the index
they consistently maintain and innovate.
To be clear, our proposal does not urge property to the exclusion of other
modes of production, such as government subsidy or peer-production. Those
modes of production exist in the public and byproduct models, which
demonstrate their own distinct risks and competencies. Our exploration of
property is warranted because there is little reason to believe those models will
always be superior to a product model, particularly when property is paired
with appropriate limitations.
For instance, fair-use exceptions to property rights would protect many of
the functions indices serve and from which it would be inefficient to exclude
users. No one should have to pay to explain that their investment beat the S&P
500's returns. But it is unlikely that any index provider would attempt to
prevent such uses of the index anyway; they benefit from the index's fame. 294
For commercial users, it may be appropriate for the SEC to adopt a compulsory
licensing regime that forbids exclusive dealings between a provider and a
single product vendor. 2 9 5 Steps like this can reduce the costs of property.

291.
Sui generis regimes have been subject to criticism, e.g., David Nimmer, Codifying
Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1233, 1327-1331 (2004), but may nevertheless be the best
option given the concerns addressed.
292.
The United States generally does not recognize copyrights in databases or compilations.
See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). But see CCC Info. Servs. v.
Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing copyright protection for
compilation of automobile prices). Morever, it is not clear that database protection would be useful here.
Germany has database rights, but still affords indices few protections.
293.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
294.
Telephone interview with Alex Matturri,* Chief Executive Officer of S&P Dow Jones
Indices (Dec. 19, 2011).
295.
S.E.C. Rule 19c-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-5 (2012), prohibits an exchange from adopting
rules that would bar the exchange from listing any stock options class "because that options class was
listed on another options exchange." Id. § 240.19c-5(a)(3). The SEC has declined to prohibit exchanges
from being a party to exclusive licensing arrangements, the effect of which is to inhibit the listing of
index options on other exchanges. See Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc. v. Int'l Sec. Exch., LLC, No.
06-CH-24798, at 14-15 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2010). This parallel rule would do much to address output
restrictions and market power.
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The practical implementation of this proposal is more feasible because of
last year's Dodd-Frank Act. 2 96 Dodd-Frank requires the clearing at Derivatives
Clearing Organizations of many derivatives that were once over-the-counter.
For the first time, swaps from all over the country will be centralized and
subject to rules. It would be easy to collect licensing fees from the
clearinghouse, which could pass the fees on to its users. At the very moment
that product index economics are most necessary, it has become practically
possible to collect fees from swap participants using indices like Libor.
IV. Conclusion
This Article makes two novel contributions. First, we develop a taxonomy
and model for understanding financial indices. This framework emphasizes the
irreducible subjectivity built into index production. This subjectivity, which is a
key component of indices' value to users, also carries the potential for
manipulation and malproduction. Our model goes on to show that the risks
inherent in indices are fundamentally related to their type, and any solutions
must be tailored to an index's taxonomic characteristics. Recognizing that
many index problems are rooted in a market failure of unstable or uncertain
property rights, our second major contribution is developing a novel solution
applicable to a whole range of index problems. Counterintuitively, the best way
to prevent index manipulation may be through increasing present index
providers' intellectual property protections.

Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2012,
296.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, §§ 723, 763(a) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.).
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Appendix A: Taxonomy

Example

Public Index

Product Index

Byproduct Index

GDP, PPI

S&P 500, Platts

Libor, NYMEX,
Prime

Key Features

Policy
political

or

May
require
intellectual
property rights

Dependant
some
profitable
activity.
draw upon

upon
other
May
own

data

Producer Motives

Share

Sell as product

Use, or required
for other

Underproduction
Risk

No profit motive
to encourage an
adequate level

Monopoly
restricted output

of production

Malproduction
Risk

Manipulation Risk

No profit motive
to
encourage
attention to use
demand
May be run for
political
objectives

activity

Only
indirect
attention paid to
quantity
demanded

Market
power
insulates
from
competition

Only
indirect
attention paid to
quality concerns

May be run to
advantage
favored
customers

Lack of incentive
to
control
employees. The
firm's use in own
contracts and data
makes it easier to

profit

from

manipulation

Solution

Insulate
from
political whims

Enable
market
and enforcement.
Provide
public
alternate,
and
ensure fair use of
index
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Bolster
intellectual
property to allow
transition
to
product index

